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1 Executive Summary 
The increasing purchasing power of 1,095,351,995 Indians and the growing 
manufacturing base for export are creating a potential for HEMPEL in India of 
approximately 94 million litres. 75 million litres of these are from the Protective 
segment where HEMPEL’s new strategic goal is to be a profitable No. 1 by market 
share by 2011. 
 
HEMPEL’s present set-up in India is very small, but this dissertation will show how 
analyses of theory, India and HEMPEL come together in unity to promote an 
expansion of HEMPEL’s activities in India.   
 
The existing literature and theories from renowned scholars and researchers, 
especially the Uppsala Internationalisation Model, suggest that HEMPEL has 
followed the gradual internationalisation and based on experience gained in India 
and abroad are ready to go to the next stage. 
 
The PEST analysis used for the external environment in India reveals a challenging 
society with risks that should not be underestimated. The political and economic 
systems, the most influential factors, are however quite stable for an emerging 
market and both are steadily improving for foreign companies looking to invest. India 
is thereby also an attractive market for HEMPEL’s main competitors and 
International Paints have already established own production while Jotun is in the 
process of building their factory. An intense competition on price to gain early market 
shares is therefore considered one of the greatest risks. 
 
The analysis of the internal environment will show that HEMPEL has the products, 
brand, experience and financial resources to succeed in India. The current results 
from HEMPEL’s focused approach in India are in support of this. Very importantly 
the expansion fits well with HEMPEL’s new global strategy for the Marine segment 
focusing on profitability while the expansion into the second largest market for the 
Protective segment in HEMPEL’s Asia Pacific region could prove vital for the 
Protective regional strategy. 
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The recommendation to HEMPEL’s Top Management is that this dissertation should 
pave way for a more detailed business plan. This would in turn be expected to result 
in an approval for expansion in a country, which could grow to be one of the largest 
in the HEMPEL Group within the next 5-10 years and provide an estimated EUR 3.8 
million in Net Present Value.  
  
2 Introduction 
2.1 Motivation 
My motivation for choosing this topic is threefold. 
 
HEMPEL India was on the verge of being closed down in 2003 and 1 January 2004 it 
was placed under my responsibility as a non-focus area. Together with a limited 
number of staff in India we managed to triple our business and deliver very decent 
profits. During these years India as a whole has gone through an amazing economic 
development and one will constantly hear about the future prospects of the Indian 
markets. 
 
The combination of these two positive developments has spurred HEMPEL’s 
management to request for an evaluation of the options in India. India definitely 
seems to be an attractive business opportunity, but the lack of research from 
HEMPEL’s side prevents the managers from having a solid knowledge base for 
decision-making. This dissertation should provide a more thorough understanding of 
the literature and theories on Internationalisation, the external environment for 
HEMPEL’s market in India, the actions of HEMPEL’s major global competitors in 
India and HEMPEL’s fit with the Indian markets.  
 
For me personally this could of course not happen at a better time. I will have the 
opportunity to write about a business that means a lot to me and I hope that a 
thorough objective piece of work could be the foundation for a very important 
decision to be made by our management. I have been fortunate enough to have the 
study sponsored by the company I work for and I am positive that they will benefit in 
the long run, but furthermore I hope that this dissertation can give them an 
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immediate return on their investment. Due to the tough competitive markets and 
constant quest for efficiency it is increasingly difficult for the management of 
HEMPEL to find qualified resources and the time it requires to conduct thorough 
studies of all new potential business areas. The company could of course always 
decide to purchase such work, but this comes at a considerable cost. More 
importantly it will be difficult and time consuming for an external party for obtain in-
depth knowledge about the culture, products, markets etc. of the company and the 
recommendations may therefore not fully match the individual company. 
 
When I decided to opt for the general MBA my goal was to obtain a broad and solid 
understanding of the fundamentals for a business. I feel that the 12 modules have 
provided this and I would have enjoyed writing a dissertation that could cover all 
subjects. Such a dissertation would naturally be much too comprehensive, but 
staying within the given parameters I am very pleased to have found a dissertation 
topic drawing on major areas such as international business, business economics, 
marketing, finance & accounting, corporate financial strategy and strategic 
management. 
 
2.2 Aims and objectives 
In line with the above motivation my aims for this dissertation are therefore to provide 
recommendations on the two following points: 
x Should HEMPEL expand their activities in India? 
And if so, 
x Which mode of operation should be used e.g. export, sales through agent, 
joint venture, own sales subsidiary, manufacturing etc. 
 
In order to arrive at the recommendations my objectives are to conduct thorough 
analysis of: 
x The existing literature and theories on Internationalisation and India 
x The external environment for the paint market in India 
x The internal environment for HEMPEL 
x HEMPEL’s strategic options 
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2.3 Structure of the thesis 
The overall structure of this thesis is built on inspiration from Kotler’s (1997) 
Business Strategic-Planning Process where it follows the steps up to the Program 
formulation stage. The earlier part of the process is very useful for building a 
proposal for a strategy for HEMPEL in India whereas the stages from the Program 
formulation and onwards are essential activities after the proposed strategy has met 
the required approval from top management.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: The Business Strategic-planning Process (Kotler, 1997) 
 
Before embarking on a proposal for a strategy Chapter 3 will contain a literature 
review of existing material on the subject of Internationalisation published by 
recognised researchers and scholars. The review will attempt to find out how the 
pieces of literature relate to each other and to find weaknesses as well as strengths. 
The review of the literature on Internationalisation, especially the Uppsala 
Internationalisation Model, will provide a good understanding of how companies 
have faced similar challenges in the past and how recommendations from existing 
theories can guide HEMPEL in their further Internationalisation.   
 
Chapter 4 contains a section on methodology explaining which theories will be used 
and how the data was collected and analysed. India presents certain challenges in 
terms of availability of data, so this section will explain how this was overcome to 
arrive at reasonable and useful results. 
 
Chapter 5 will then start with a very brief overview of HEMPEL’s global mission and 
vision. In HEMPEL’s case the vision will set the boundaries for the external 
environment analysis in Chapter 6 and the internal environment analysis in Chapter 
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7. The analysis of the environment will be utilised for the SWOT analysis in Chapter 
8, which in turn will be used to set the goals for HEMPEL India in chapter 9. In order 
to keep the dissertation on a more theoretical level the goals will only be broadly 
defined in the main paper and then set in greater details in the Net Present Value 
(NPV) analysis in appendix 4. 
 
To achieve the goals Chapter 10 will outline a proposed strategy for HEMPEL India 
based on considerations regarding non-equity versus equity modes and import 
versus local manufacturing. 
 
For the sake of good order a number of definitions are included as appendix 1 to this 
dissertation. 
 
3 Literature review 
We often hear that the world is becoming a smaller place and that certainly seems to 
be reflected in the increasing internationalisation of companies. This change in the 
world economy has, for the last three decades especially, motivated research from 
all corners of the globe and resulted in some very useful theories. The most 
accepted theories are dealing with different aspects of internationalisation and they 
are predominantly complementary. 
 
Strategic behaviour 
F. T. Knickerbocker (1973) produced one of the more straight-forward theories 
explaining that the pattern of foreign direct investments of companies in an oligopoly 
is dominated by their strategic behaviour. Similar to the Game Theory developed by 
economists the actions of one oligopolistic company will influence the actions of 
another oligopolistic company. Knickerbocker thereby implies that many companies 
in such a competitive environment simply mirror each other’s actions to prevent that 
one of their few major competitors gain an advantage abroad, which potentially could 
also become an advantage in their home country. This theory is also relevant for 
Multi National Enterprises (MNEs) fighting on a global scene in so-called multipoint 
competition. The simplicity of the theory naturally leaves many questions 
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unanswered such as; what about companies in a non-oligopolistic market structure; 
when should the first-mover venture abroad; how to do it etc. – if every company 
followed Knickerbocker’s theory we would not have internationalisation. 
 
The Product Life Cycle 
Another early theory is developed by Raymond Vernon (1966) where he argues that 
his Product Life Cycle, a commonly used tool in marketing, also explains the pattern 
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). His research concluded that U.S. companies 
usually decided to keep the production of new products at home since the 
advantages of being close to their own expertise, known suppliers etc. could not be 
outweighed by the lower production costs abroad. As the product matures is 
becomes more standardised which opens opportunities for abroad production. 
Furthermore, increased competition on a mature product shifts more focus to costs. 
As long as the marginal costs of production and transportation from the home 
country are lower than the average production costs abroad Vernon argues that 
companies will stay at home. When abroad demand grows large enough to enjoy 
economies of scale in two production sites, the labour costs becomes the major 
differentiator and companies may decide to invest abroad. Similarly to 
Knickerbocker, Vernon argues that a threat to the status quo at home may motivate 
competitors to follow suit. Furthermore, his theory also fails to explain when FDI 
should be undertaken and why local production is chosen instead of other options 
such as licensing.   
 
The Internalisation Theory 
One theory that provides assistance in the issue of local production versus licensing 
is the internalisation theory. Several sources have contributed to this theory and one 
of the later journals by Hill & Kim (1988) is used here. Based on classic economic 
teaching on transaction costs, the MNEs should not exist in perfect market 
conditions as the company would sell its license to an abroad company. The world 
markets are however not perfect as licensing are subject to significant risks. As 
mentioned by Hill & Kim (1988) technological know-how is very difficult to valuate 
and therefore it cannot be traded fairly in the open market. Furthermore the selling 
company risks that the buying company may misuse the license and technology 
obtained for their own production later or sell it on to the highest bidder. The risk is 
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naturally greater as the products become more technically advanced and this 
concern is therefore very valid in HEMPEL’s case. Other risks of licensing arises 
from the loss of control with manufacturing, marketing etc. where the licensee e.g. 
may not maintain the same manufacturing standards or sell at lower prices 
compared to the agreement and the overall strategic plan. Finally the licensee may 
be able to produce the physical product, but the different management and 
marketing may not perform as efficiently. Despite this last point the theory has been 
criticised for looking too much at the cost side and too little on the revenue side as a 
wholly owned subsidiary potentially could earn higher revenues at a similar cost 
structure. This theory highlights some very important risks associated to licensing, 
but it still fails to explain when HEMPEL should increase the activities in India and 
why it should be India instead of so many other countries. 
 
The Eclectic (OLI) Paradigm 
Dunning (2001) presented in 1976 his Eclectic Paradigm, which builds on the above 
theories and in addition includes the advantages of a specific location as an 
important influencer on FDI decisions. Dunning splits the above internalisation theory 
into owner-specific advantages (quality of home management etc.) and 
internalisation advantages (benefits from keeping competitive advantages in-house 
instead of selling them off). These three advantages make up the eclectic paradigm 
also known as the OLI paradigm. Dunning’s paradigm finds more use as it highlights 
the very import advantages from choosing the correct location. India e.g. has a lot of 
inexpensive low-skilled labour, a lot of inexpensive higher-skilled labour, plenty of 
land etc. These location specific factors cannot easily be transferred, but they can be 
combined with a company’s technological, management and/or marketing 
competencies (Hill, 2006). The paradigm has found wide-spread support and most 
literature related to FDI is utilising Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (Ramasamy, 2003). It 
has however also received a fair share of criticism, some of which are brought up in 
the following, but Dunning is fast to point out that no single theory can explain all FDI 
activity. Similarly to the internalisation theory it is criticised for paying too much 
attention to costs and not enough to revenues (Dunning, 2001). Furthermore the 
OLIs represent so many variables that it according to critics is almost impossible to 
predict anything from the paradigm. According to Dunning the OLI variables are 
supposed to be independent from each other, but critics say that this will be a rare 
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occurrence. The business environment is constantly changing and the paradigm is 
criticised for being too static and not providing enough insight into the 
internationalisation process of a firm (Dunning, 2001).  
 
The Uppsala Internationalisation Model 
Jan Johanson and Finn Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) have built a model based on a 
more behavioural approach, which they believe better describes this 
internationalisation process of a firm. They used the data from four Swedish 
companies to conclude that internationalisation most often happens as a gradual 
process. This process is related to the transaction costs changing over time due to 
increased levels of knowledge and this is the main difference compared to the 
eclectic paradigm where the decision makers are assumed to be fully informed from 
the outset as highlighted by Johanson & Vahlne (1990), who developed the research 
further. 
 
Their assumptions are based on companies building the business in their home 
country before looking abroad and that the process is based on incremental 
decisions. They argue that lack of knowledge and resources are the greater 
inhibitors to internationalisation.  
 
To minimise the risk associated to limited knowledge companies will start by 
expanding in countries well-known to the company due to geographical closeness to 
the home country or countries close in terms of psychic distance (culture, language, 
political and economical systems etc.). In addition to the importance of distance they 
highlight that the export plans naturally will be heavily dependent on the potential of 
the market. 
 
To minimise the risk of losing invested resources Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul 
(1975) argues that companies will start small and grow as they obtain more 
knowledge through experience.  
 
They created the following stages for the internationalisation process: 
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1. No regular export activities 
2. Export via independent representatives (agent) 
3. Sales subsidiary 
4. production/manufacturing 
 
Their model is build up with market knowledge and market commitment as state 
aspects while commitment decisions and current activities are change aspects. This 
means that a company’s market knowledge and present market commitment will 
influence their commitment decisions and current activities. As the commitment 
decisions and current activities change they will in turn change (improve) the 
company’s market knowledge and change the market commitment as shown in the 
below figure 3.1 (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). This model will be applied to HEMPEL 
in section 9 for further clarification. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The basic mechanism of the internationalisation process of a company (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) 
 
The above model is based on the assumptions that the company seeks long-term 
profit and growth while maintaining a risk-adverse position. The company in a risk-
adverse position will thereby try to expand its business as much as possible in 
search for higher profits, but only until it hits its acceptable risk ceiling. 
 
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul accepts that geographical and psychic distances 
are not the only determinants for choice of country, the potential size of the market is 
naturally very important. They believe that the representative/agent mode is used in 
the initial phases where psychic distance is the ruling factor and the sales subsidiary 
mode will be more relevant further on in the process when the market size is the 
dominant factor. Production/manufacturing, the fourth stage, is likewise influenced by 
psychic distance and market size, but additionally by factors such as import duties, 
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transportation costs etc. If the market size increases, and thereby the potential for 
profits, the company is likely to accept a greater risk e.g. a large market in India 
should justify a greater risk in absolute terms compared to a small market in Sri 
Lanka. 
 
The issue of risk brings us to the three exceptions to their model. 1. Companies with 
larger resources may go faster through the internationalisation process as they can 
afford to take greater risks. 2. In a very stable and transparent market the uncertainty 
will be less and the process may be faster due to a reduced need for knowledge. 3. 
Companies with experience from similar markets may consider the uncertainty to be 
less and take larger internationalisation steps (Johanson & Vahlne, 1990). 
 
They also present a pattern where companies go through phases. One phase is 
dominated by establishments of agencies, thereafter a phase with establishments of 
sales subsidiaries and finally a phase with production establishments. This will only 
be briefly touched upon later in the dissertation, but the focus will be more on the 
above factors of choice of location and the process through the various stages. 
 
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul are not looking at the reasons for exporting and 
they accept that the model is simplified by using only four distinctive stages which 
may not all be used for each and every case. Their model has met wide acceptance 
from various countries such as Hawaii (Hook & Czinkota, 1989), Turkey 
(Karafakioglu, 1986), Canada (Denis & Depelteau, 1985), Japan (Johansson & 
Nonaka, 1983), U.S. (Bilkey & Tesar, 1977)(Davidson, 1980) and the E.U. 
(Gankema et al, 2000). 
 
Despite, or one could maybe even say because of, its popularity the model has 
received a great deal of criticism and some of this is discussed below. 
 
Reid & Rosson (1987) and Turnbull (1987) argue that the model is too deterministic 
to explain a complicated issue such as internationalisation behaviour. Similarly to 
Dunning’s statement above Johanson & Vahlne (1990) accept that the model is not 
all encompassing and call for further research to develop the model. 
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Karafakioglu (1986) highlights that there are limited studies on the 
internationalisation process for developing countries and that intense international 
competition is as much a limiting factor for international orientation for Turkish 
companies as lack of knowledge. 
  
Instead of the four stages in the Uppsala model Karafakioglu (1986) uses the export 
development stages proposed by various researchers such as Bilkey & Tesar 
(1977). The theories are complementary with Bilkey & Tesar basically following the 
same argumentation to split stage 1 and 2 up in more detailed stages.  
 
The valuable knowledge sought after in the Uppsala model would according to 
classical thinking on FDIs relate to present and future demand and supply, 
competition and channels of distribution, payment conditions, transferability of 
currency (Denis & Depelteau, 1985), cultural, political and social factors (Johansson 
& Nonaka, 1983), tariff and non-tariff barriers, input costs, legal and economic 
conditions (Davidson, 1980). Davidson’s research shows however that these factors 
alone cannot explain many FDI decision whereas he supports the pattern related to 
geographical and psychic distance. 
  
Denis & Depelteau (1985) accept that it is an extensively recognised theoretical 
model, but argues that it may be difficult to convert it into operational measures. 
Along the same lines Gankema et al (2000) argue that the numerous factors 
influencing the Uppsala model make it difficult to use and they therefore use the 
Innovation model by Cavusgil where the determining factor is the export/sales ratio. 
 
Johanson & Vahlne (1977) argue that experiential knowledge is critical for success, 
which is in line with Denis & Depelteau’s (1985) argument that knowledge obtained 
in the field and through experience from business transactions is more valuable than 
public and private information services. This is especially valid for less structured 
activities such as management activities in India. It is therefore recommended that 
the governments stop adding to the already sufficient available information and 
instead arrange “field activities”. The Danish government is increasingly doing this 
now such as the recent business delegations to Vietnam and India. 
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The slow careful approach and entry into countries similar to the home country is 
supported by Johansson & Nonaka (1983) describing how Asian car manufacturers 
used Australia as a “dress rehearsal” to build up experience before going to the 
important larger markets in the West. 
 
Since the Uppsala internationalisation model is built on the theory that increased 
knowledge will reduce risk and motivate investment of additional resources it does 
not hold for companies in the service industry (Sharma & Johanson, 1987). Since 
service companies do not have the same degree of requirement for investments in 
immovable fixed assets their risk is significantly lower and research have shown that 
service companies therefore often establish a sales subsidiary in the foreign 
immediately at the start of business.   
 
The validity of some of the major assumptions in the model is challenged by Hedlund 
& Kverneland (1985). They argue that the international experience of MNEs has 
increased since the birth of the model and that this could result in companies 
skipping stages in the process. They also argue that the world is more uniform today 
and that companies therefore will not encounter the same level of uncertainty. 
Vahlne & Nordström (1993) supports the above thinking and at the same time raises 
concerns due to the increased degree of industry internationalisation. The increased 
competition from other MNEs in the host markets is likely to affect the process. While 
still agreeing with the core of the aspects of the internationalisation process they 
propose an addition of explanatory variables to account for the changing 
environment. 
 
There is no doubt that the world is a smaller place primarily due to advances in 
technology, but I will argue that the model still holds when one e.g. compares India 
to a European country. The differences are vast and the uncertainty related to FDIs 
in India is a major obstacle. 
 
The model has, as mentioned above, been tested by researchers in many different 
countries, but specific work in this field related to India is unfortunately missing and 
could be an interesting area for further research. 
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4 Methodology and demarcations 
The primary data used in this dissertation is predominantly obtained through the use 
of semi-structured interviews. This form of interview allows the interviewer to go 
through a planned agenda while allowing the interviewee the freedom to add 
valuable information that would not be encouraged by more closed questions. The 
interviews add validity to the arguments as the information comes from the sources 
closest to the market. Secondly it adds value to information from secondary data and 
helps fill the gaps where secondary data is unavailable. 
 
The secondary data is obtained through internal sources such as annual reports, 
sales statistics etc. and external sources such as journals, articles, books, 
governmental publications, the websites etc. 
 
Secondary data in India is unfortunately not as readily available as in e.g. Europe or 
Singapore. Especially assessing the potential for the Protective market is quite 
challenging as the market is very large in terms of number of customers and 
geographical spread with minimal statistical information available. By combining all 
available secondary sources and having it validated by primary sources the data is 
judged to provide a reasonable foundation for decision-making, but the potential 
inaccuracy should be considered when choosing a strategy. 
 
To support the theoretical framework the following theories have been used. 
 
PEST analysis 
The strategic management of a company must ensure that it is correctly positioned 
in relation to the factors that influence it. The macro-environment is ever-changing 
and despite the efforts of many, especially larger organisations, to influence the 
environment they cannot control most factors and uncertainties (Thompson, 1990). 
The changes and uncertainties can provide a company with threats, opportunities 
and constrains (Pearce et al, 1997). Companies that have operated in a market for 
years may be relatively well informed about the characteristics of the environment, 
but companies such as HEMPEL seeking new (or predominantly new) markets in 
foreign countries are likely to be less informed. 
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The PEST analysis is a logical framework that categorises the environmental factors 
as Political, Economical, Socio-cultural and Technological. As mentioned by Kotler 
(1997) the PEST analysis is a useful tool to provide an indication of the business 
potential formed by the opportunities and threats. The PEST, with its macro view, 
should not in itself be basis for strategic decisions, but rather be the stepping stone 
for further analysis. 
 
The demographical environment is often included in the PEST analysis, but since the 
huge population of India is so interesting for businesses, it will have a small separate 
section of its own.  
  
Porter’s Diamond 
Remaining at the macro-environment, history has proven that some countries 
perform better than other countries within certain industries. The Heckscher-Ohlin 
Theory contributes this to factor endowments such as natural resources, 
demographics etc., but Porter takes their theory further by using four attributes (Hill, 
2006). These four attributes are Factor endowments, Demand conditions, Relating & 
supporting industries and Firm strategy, structure & rivalry as can be seen in figure 
6.6 in section 6.2.5. 
 
By utilising Porter’s Diamond HEMPEL can evaluate the prospects of the coatings 
market in India in relation to international competition. There will be increased 
incentives to invest in India if its competitive advantage is strong enough to deter 
imports from foreign countries or to even facilitate exports to countries weaker within 
the four attributes. 
   
Porter’s five forces 
When proceeding with the analysis from a macro-environment and bringing it closer 
to the company Porter (1980) argues the importance of not only focusing on 
immediate rivals, but rather include the major influences on the particular industry, 
market or market segment. Figure 6.7 in section 6.3 shows the five forces identified 
by Porter: Rivalry among existing firms, bargaining power of suppliers, bargaining 
power of customers, threat of new entrants and threat of substitute products or 
services. 
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As mentioned by Kotler (1997) an analysis of the five forces will enable a company 
like HEMPEL to evaluate the potential for long-term profits in the industry in India 
and thereby determine its attractiveness. Based on the analysis HEMPEL can then 
e.g. decide not to participate or align itself according to the gained knowledge to take 
advantage of opportunities. In addition to the macro-environment analysis this would 
thereby be another tool helping to shape the business strategy for India. 
   
Value Chain 
After analysing the macro-environment and the industry it is essential to understand 
the prospects of the companies when faced with competition. According to Porter 
(1985) a company can obtain competitive advantage through cost leadership or 
differentiation. It is difficult to analyse a company’s competitive advantage when 
looking at the company as one big unit and Porter therefore developed the Value 
Chain to easier understand how each main activity within the company influences 
their cost position and level of differentiation. The value chain is displayed as figure 
7.14 in section 7.5. 
 
In order for HEMPEL to efficiently implement the strategy and reach the vision 
highlighted in section 7.1 it is vital that each of its main activities is managed 
correctly and in line with the generic strategy (Hill, 2006). The analysis of HEMPEL’s 
value chain will thereby explain how the various activities add value, where the value 
is added and if the day-to-day actions are consistent with the overall strategy.  
 
SWOT analysis 
The SWOT analysis will build on the analysis of the external environment to examine 
opportunities and threats and the internal environment to examine a company’s 
strengths and weaknesses. This section will thereby provide an evaluation of how 
the capabilities of HEMPEL fit the needs of the environment for the Marine and 
Protective coating markets in India (Thomson, 1990). In order for a company to 
achieve strategic success it is essential that all resources are co-ordinated to obtain 
competitive advantage. Concurrently the company must be aware of potential 
opportunities and threats in order to make the best possible strategic decision and 
align the organisation accordingly. 
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Demarcations 
HEMPEL is globally active in 5 business areas: Marine, Protective, Container, Yacht 
and Decorative. The scope of this dissertation does not allow in-depth analysis of too 
many areas and the focus is therefore on the Marine and Protective as these are the 
core competence areas for HEMPEL (APAC) while the Decorative paints are 
excluded for now.  
 
Since the Indian markets for Container and Yacht coatings are extremely small any 
attention towards these cannot be justified at this point in time and they have 
therefore been excluded from this dissertation. 
 
5 HEMPEL’s global mission and vision 
In order for a company to build a meaningful strategy it is according to Kotler (1997) 
essential that the company is clear about the purpose for its existence, which is 
commonly expressed in a mission statement. HEMPEL’s mission statement below is 
guiding an environment where continuous development of products, people and 
processes supply customers with answers that may not be the lowest priced, but 
best value in the longer term. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: HEMPEL’s mission statement, source: HEMPEL Group Strategy 2007-2011 (Eggers, 2006) 
 
The company vision, or goals and objectives, will help to make the mission 
statement more tangible. According to HEMPEL’s Group President and CEO Pierre 
Yves Jullien (2006) his ambition is for HEMPEL to have a growth twice that of the 
market, which should enable HEMPEL to fulfil the below vision. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: HEMPEL’s vision, source: HEMPEL Group Strategy 2007-2011 (Eggers, 2006) 
 
“No 1 in 2012” 
“By combining an innovative environment with resourceful and 
committed employees, 
Hempel delivers and supports the most efficient coating solutions” 
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“No 1” can be understood in many different ways, so it has been further formulated 
for each of HEMPEL’s main business areas as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: HEMPEL’s strategic objectives, source: HEMPEL Group Strategy 2007-2011 (Eggers, 2006) 
 
HEMPEL’s strategy will be examined further in the analysis of the internal 
environment and section 9 will show how HEMPEL (India) can fit into the global 
objectives. 
 
Protective Objective 
“Hempel is a profitable no. 1 in market share globally by 
end 2011”
Decorative Objective 
“Hempel holds a profitable top position in market share 
(EUR) in selected niches by end 2011” 
Marine Objective 
“Hempel is number 1 by EBIT margin globally by end 
2011”
Yacht Objective 
“Hempel is the fastest growing, profitable supplier 
2007-2011”
Container Objective 
“Hempel is number 1 by EBIT margin globally 2006-
2011”
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6 Analysis of the paint market in India 
6.1 Demographics 
Demography usually includes studies of various aspects of the human population. 
Due to the nature of HEMPEL’s business and the objectives of this dissertation this 
section will focus on the size of the population and the development of the same. 
Together with the following PEST analysis this will lead to an understanding of the 
market potential discussed in section 6.4. 
 
India is the world’s second most populous country with an estimated 1,095,351,995 
people as of July 2006 (Wikipedia, 2006) excluding the disputed territories of Azad 
Kashmir and Aksai Chin. This is of course only surpassed by China with an 
approximate figure of 1.3 billion. According to a BBC (2004) article the Washington-
based Population Reference Bureau estimates that India in 2050 with 1.628 billion 
people will have overtaken China estimated to grow to 1.437 billion. CNN (2006) 
estimate that India will have a population larger than China’s already in 2015. 
 
To add more meaning to the above figures it is interesting to note that India makes 
up approximately 1/6 of the world’s population and that the number of people in India 
every year increases with an estimated 20 million which is similar to the total 
population of Australia (Wikipedia, 2006).  
 
6.2 PEST analysis and Porter’s Diamond 
As mentioned by Hill (2006) it has often been discussed which environment will be 
most conducive for economic growth and in the West this is usually related to a 
representative democracy and a free market economy. This is quite interesting since 
the two present powerhouses of growth, India and China, do not fit those labels.   
6.2.1 Political and legal factors 
When India got their independence in 1947 some of the inspiration from the British 
was used to create the world’s largest democracy (Wilson & Keim, 2006). However, 
in objection to the previous British rule the new government initiated a closed 
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socialist-style political system. In the following decades India was controlled by the 
Indian National Congress (INC) except for brief interventions. In 1996 the first right-
of-centre party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) gained control for a mere 13 days until 
power went back to a left-of-centre party, the United Front. In 1998 the BJP regained 
power in a coalition with smaller parties called the National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA) (Wikipedia, 2006). The BJP managed to implement many clever 
macroeconomic reforms and achieve excellent growth in their 5 years of rule, but as 
mentioned by Ramasamy (2006) it can be dangerous for a democratically elected 
government to introduce reforms, which will benefit the majority in the long run, but 
not be appreciated or fully understood by the same majority in the short run. The 
people of India, more concerned with the level of corruption and low quality of public 
services, therefore gave the presently residing United Progressive Alliance (UPA) a 
surprise victory in 2004 (Das, 2006).  
 
The more open views and careful reforms started in the 1980s with then Prime 
Minster Rajiv Ghandi, but the real change started in 1991 through more radical 
reforms created by the Finance Minister at the time Manmohan Singh who is now 
Prime Minister (Das, 2006). 
 
For the MNEs considering FDIs in India the instability of the recent governments 
combined with the fact that the present government coalition consists of 15 parties 
could be a concern. The instability may deter the government from making 
unpopular, long-sighted, but useful reforms and a dispersed government is likely to 
take longer time to solve some of India‘s biggest issues such as bureaucracy noted 
by Patel (2004) from the World Bank. On the positive side the improvement in 
reforms, albeit slow, has continued steadily over the last decades despite the 
changes of governments. The present opposition party BJP is known to be more 
protective of domestic markets, but at the same time more pro-capitalism (Limaye, 
1998) so it is difficult to find much literature negative on India’s prospects. The 
opinions are more on how well India will do and if they can outperform China as 
discussed in a symposium of views in The International Economy magazine (2006).  
 
A further indication of the positive political developments in India can be found in the 
rating from Freedom House (2006) where India is given a “free” rating of 2 including 
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a positive upwards trend arrow with 7 being the lowest score as a measure for 
political freedom.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Map of political freedom (Freedom House, 2006) 
 
When analyzing the political environment India adds a second dimension in the form 
of their 25 states and 7 centrally administered union territories where the challenges 
can be quite different in terms of e.g. political leadership, state-federal relations, 
incentives, environmental regulation, labour laws, infrastructure etc. (Kumar & 
Thacker-Kumar, 1996)(Limaye, 1998). The choice of state for a company’s new 
venture is therefore of great importance.  
 
The legal challenges, most blamed on the heavy bureaucracy, are reflected in the 
World Bank’s rating for “Ease of doing business” which places India 116th out of 155 
countries (World Bank, 2006). The same pool of ratings provides a good measure of 
India’s outdated and business-inhibiting labour laws. The World Bank gives the 
labour challenges in India a rating of 62 where 100 is the worst. In comparison China 
scores 30, the U.K. scores 14 and Singapore a perfect 0. It is very difficult to fire a 
worker in India and companies with more than 100 employees even have to seek the 
government’s approval first (Heritage Foundation, 2006). An example is given by 
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Das (2006) where it took a company 17 years with court cases before they won the 
right to fire an employee that repeatedly was caught sleeping on the job. 
 
The below figure created based on a rating from Transparency International (2006), 
a non-governmental organization against corruption, shows that India’s rating is not 
far from the most corrupt country in the listing, Bangladesh. Payment of bribes to win 
business is of course illegal in most countries such as the U.S. and OECD countries, 
but “facilitating” payments are excluded (Hill, 2006). Facilitating payments are 
supposed to be payments made to speed up processes which should have been 
carried out anyway, but there is a lack of clear definitions as to where, who, why and 
how much. Foreign companies are therefore left with a choice of either engaging in 
payments of facilitation money or accepting that certain processes such as official 
approvals may take a long time to complete. 
 
Corruption Perceptions Index (0=highly corrupt, 10=highly clean)
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Iceland
Finland
New Zealand
Denmark
Singapore
United
Italy
China
India
Vietnam
Indonesia
Bangladesh
 
Figure 6.2: Selected corruption rankings 2005 (Transparency International, 2006) 
 
There are many different suggestions on how to deal with the political developments, 
bureaucracy and corruption such as well-informed managers, local consultants, 
experienced joint venture partners (Limaye, 1998) and dedicated staff only for these 
challenges (Kumar & Thacker-Kumar, 1996). The political environment does 
therefore not pose a great risk as long as companies factor in the associated direct 
costs and/or the need for additional resources. 
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6.2.2 Economical factors 
India is a true mixed economy with heavy government intervention in certain areas 
such as international trade where India scores a 5, which is the lowest possible 
rating given by the Heritage Foundation (2006) in their evaluation of economic 
freedom. Before the more ambitious reforms in 1991 mentioned in the previous 
section, India was very much a closed economy with average tariffs exceeding 
200%, peak tariffs of 350% (Ernst & Young, 2006), tough quantitative restrictions 
and limitations on foreign investment (World Bank, 2006). 
 
15 years of economic reforms have seen the average tariffs for non-agriculture 
sectors fall below 15% and foreign investment restrictions have been significantly 
relaxed. This opening towards international trade is evident in India’s import and 
export percentages of GDP from the World Bank where exports have risen from 14% 
in 2000 to 19% in 2004 and imports have risen from 15% in 2000 to 23% in 2004. 
For HEMPEL this means that the cost structures for local manufacturing versus 
import from e.g. Singapore would be as displayed in the below table 6.3. The cost 
structures have been verified by Ernst & Young (Navale, 2006) and their implications 
on a selection of strategy will be explained further in section 10.2. 
 
 
Table 6.3: Cost structures for local manufacturing versus import of finished goods 
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The large government machine is naturally costly to operate and its expenses in 
2003 amounted to 29.1% of India’s GDP. The government intervention is especially 
prudent in the banking sector where state-owned banks administer more than 70% 
of all deposits and loans. The banking sector is unlikely to change in the near future, 
but the government is opening up for private companies in e.g. the huge oil & gas 
sector, which will hopefully reduce India’s revenues from state-owned assets that 
presently accounts for 17.9% (Heritage Foundation, 2006). 
 
India is in 2006 categorised as “Mostly Unfree” in economic terms and rated 121st 
out of 164 countries by the Heritage Foundation, but as the below graph 6.4 shows 
how India is steadily improving. 
 
 Economic Freedom (1=best, 5=worst)
Past & Present Scores
3.93 3.93 3.88 3.83 3.93 3.93 3.91 3.61
3.58 3.53 3.53 3.49
1
2
3
4
5
'95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06
 
Figure 6.4: India’s Economic Freedom ranking (Heritage Foundation, 2006) 
 
In the first half of the 20th century India’s average economic growth was exactly the 
same as the growth in population; 0.8%. In the 30 years that followed the 
independence, an average economic growth of 3.5% exceeded the population 
growth creating a per capita growth average of 1.3% (Das, 2006). When the reforms 
started to have a more significant impact between 1980 and 2002 the country saw 
an average growth of 6%. According to data from the World Bank (2006a) the growth 
in GDP has risen to 8.6% in 2003, 8.5% in 2004 and 8.5% in 2005 making it one of 
the fastest growing economies in the world. 
 
India’s gross national income (GNI) per capita has grown from US$ 450 in 2000 to 
US$ 620 in 2004, an increase of 37.8%. In comparison the GNI per capita for the 
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U.S. has grown 20.5% in the same period. The US$ 620 places India in the low 
income bracket (World Bank, 2006b), but considering that an estimated 390 million 
Indians live under the poverty line, which means survive on less than US$ 1 per day, 
there is a huge group of approximately 710 million Indians that easily fits into the 
next bracket which is the lower middle income spanning US$ 756 - US$ 2,995. Even 
more encouraging is the fast growing middle class now estimated to include around 
300 million Indians (Ernst & Young, 2006). 
 
When adjusting the US$ 620 for purchasing power parity (PPP) India’s GNI PPP per 
capita is US$ 3,120 in 2004 compared to the U.S. with US$ 41,440. Poverty is a 
significant and sad issue in India, but importantly for India and interested investors 
the above shows how the economic situation is improving. The slow pace of 
development within certain areas can and will be frustrating, but India is steadily 
moving up the below graph 6.5 showing the correlation between economic freedom 
and per capita income.   
 
 
Graph 6.5: Global relationship between economic freedom and per capita income (Heritage Foundation, 2006) 
 
For HEMPEL the above highlights the need to align expectations with the general 
pace of development in India to prevent disappointment. On a more positive note it 
supports the notion of an increasing local demand e.g. bridges, power plants, oil & 
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gas projects, general industry etc. as well as increased exports requiring heavy-duty 
coatings e.g. the ship building industry. 
 
 A crucial economic policy for potential investors in India is the free repatriation of 
capital investments and profits (Ernst & Young, 2006). For MNEs like HEMPEL it is 
also worth noting that transfer of royalties of up to 5% are allowed through automatic 
approvals from the RBI. 
 
6.2.3 Socio-cultural factors 
As marketing guru K.M.S. Ahluwalia stresses to his Western clients “India is 
different, India is different, India is different” (Limaye, 1998) and foreign companies 
definitely have to be aware of and respect the cultural differences just as previous 
examples have taught especially companies investing in Japan and China. 
   
80.5% of India’s population is Hindu and with 13.4% Muslims India is home to the 3rd 
largest population of Muslims after Indonesia and Pakistan. India is having its fair 
share of difficulties evident from e.g. the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan, religious 
fighting in Ayodhya in 1992 leaving 2,000 people dead, more religious fighting in 
Gujarat leaving more than 1,000 people dead (Freedom House, 2006) and the latest 
train bombings in Mumbai. These incidents are naturally not helping the business 
environment, but it seems to have only a minor negative impact. Gujarat state 
continued for example as one of the top FDI attracting states by doubling the FDIs in 
the year after the unrest (Sify, 2003) and the bombings in Mumbai are not expected 
to have a more negative impact than in New York and London. Many Danish 
companies including HEMPEL were recently involuntarily included in an unfortunate 
case related to some Danish cartoons. The worst seems to be over now, similar 
cases are hopefully not coming in the future and the business impact is worse for 
B2C markets than the B2B markets in question here so this issue is expected to 
have very little to no impact.  
 
India has 22 official languages recognised in the Indian Constitution (Ernst & Young, 
2006) with Hindi as the most spoken and the second largest population of English 
speakers with 150 million. The latter is of great importance to HEMPEL since the 
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ease of communication would help a new organisation in India integrate into the 
HEMPEL group. It will also benefit a regional management and marketing as English 
most often can be used in customer meetings, local correspondence and other 
written material such as advertising. 
 
Utilising the Heckscher-Ohlin theory on comparative advantage (Hill, 2006) India’s 
strength lies primarily within the extensive workforce. In countries such as 
Singapore, Indians and other nationalities have taken over a significant share of the 
low-paid, low-skill jobs such as construction and cleaning services. At the other end 
of the scale one will often on BBC or CNN see Indian economic analysts working for 
Deutsche Bank or Standard Chartered. For foreign companies such as HEMPEL this 
is an attractive proposition. There is a huge supply of low-skilled labour at very low 
cost and at the same time there is a healthy supply of higher-skilled English-
speaking professionals such as the 300,000 yearly graduates from India’s 
engineering and technical schools (Wilson & Keim, 2006). The figures are amazing; 
more than a million schools, 13,800 colleges, 300 universities and more than 
500,000 new students annually in the professional education facilities alone. 
 
A larger HEMPEL set-up could see a requirement for employees from all along the 
scale and it is especially interesting that graduates from technical schools with a 
specialisation in paint technology often gets a starting pay around EUR 240 per 
month. 
 
The labour force creates opportunities, but as mentioned in section 6.2.1. the 
difficulties for companies to fire employees also creates challenges/threats. The 
rapid development of the Indian economy has created an active job market and the 
previous norm of staying with one company, or a few companies, for the duration of 
one’s working life is long gone. The job scene is now dominated by an opportunistic 
behaviour where people change jobs for a little higher pay or other benefits. This 
may sound similar to most of the world, but it is such a big issue in India that the 
World Bank has listed this as one of the threats against economic progress (Jotun, 
2006). 
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As mentioned by Hill (2006) the caste system in India was officially abolished in 
1949, but it is still evident in the Indian society. Considering the caste system and the 
old British rule with their different classes it is not surprising that India’s businesses 
are very hierarchical and have a high power distance compared to most European 
countries (Hofstede, 1983). Foreign companies should take this into account when 
building their organization and deciding which employees should have certain 
responsibilities in relation to customers and official matters. If a person from a 
country with low power distance such as Denmark goes to a country with high power 
distance such as India he/she may come across as being too relaxed or even 
disrespectful if he/she does not take the cultural difference into account. 
 
6.2.4 Technological factors 
The development of today’s heavy-duty coatings is a difficult task, but the actual 
production of most paint types is a relatively simple process without demands for 
excessively high-tech machinery. HEMPEL’s R&D centres are presently situated in 
Denmark, Spain and Singapore. This is where the expertise is located, so until 
HEMPEL in India is producing on a huge scale and/or there is a shift of knowledge 
base it will not be an option to establish an R&D centre in India. This means that 
most of the competitive advantage will be created abroad and India will not have any 
problems supplying the technology required for the paint production itself. 
 
Many states in India are creating Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and industrial 
parks to attract FDIs. To compensate for India’s challenges with power outages, 
water supplies, phone lines etc. most of these areas are providing their own 
infrastructure to ensure business without disruptions. According to the World Bank 
(2006) India had as of 2004 more telephone lines, mobile phone subscriptions and 
Internet users per capita than the average for the South Asia region. Given the IT 
development and technical competences in India the technological factors are 
expected to improve faster than most other countries and create opportunities rather 
than threats for foreign companies.    
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6.2.5 Porter’s Diamond 
When trying to determine the prospect of success for the industry for heavy-duty 
coatings in India against international competition, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory 
looking at factor endowments will only take us part of the way. Porter’s Diamond 
shown below as figure 6.6 considers the factor endowments, but includes 3 
additional attributes that influence competitive advantage (Hill, 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Own creation based on Porter’s diamond (Hill, 2006) 
 
Factor Endowments 
The paint industry in India is well covered in terms of the basic factor endowments. 
As discussed earlier India provides plenty of unskilled labour and has more than 
sufficient land for establishment of manufacturing plants. India’s location is also 
favourable with the large markets in the Middle East and Asia Pacific close by. 
Especially in HEMPEL’s case this could provide opportunities for an integrated 
supply chain. India has large natural resources of iron and copper ore, but neither 
will unfortunately be beneficial for HEMPEL. 
In terms of advanced factor endowments India has a large supply of high-skilled 
inexpensive labour such as engineers and commercial graduates. The 
communication infrastructure is not the best in the world yet, but as seen in section 
6.2.4. it is now estimated to be above average in South Asia and due to the large IT 
outsourcing industry in India it is expected to improve faster than other developing 
countries. 
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Industries 
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One of India’s significant challenges and restrictions on economic growth and 
competitive advantage is their poor infrastructure. As highlighted by the World Bank 
(2006c) Indian roads carry 65% of the freight, but congestion, narrow highways and 
poor road surface quality means that trucks commonly move with speeds of 30-40 
km/h. The government has placed tariffs on freight transport by train to promote 
passenger traffic making this mode of transportation more costly than in most other 
countries. Port traffic has more than doubled from 1990 to 2001 and it is expected to 
more than double again in the next five years. Port congestion hurts industries 
importing and exporting and places them comparatively worse off than industries in 
China where the ports are more efficient. The Indian government has initiated a 
National Maritime Development Programme to accommodate for India’s global 
aspirations by assigning US$ 22 billion for investment over the next 6 years in port 
infrastructure, inland-water transport, cargo handling technology, highway 
construction, purchase of vessels etc. (TradeWinds, 2006a).  
 
Demand conditions 
The customers in India may not be the most sophisticated in the world yet in terms of 
demands for advanced coatings such as the more expensive environmental friendly 
low volatile organic compound (VOC) coatings demanded in the U.S., the higher cost 
coatings offering increased anti-corrosive protection or the biocide free fouling 
release coatings for the bottom of ships offering potential fuel savings and reduced 
impact on the environment. However, the customers have come a long way by 
moving away from locally produced inferior paints to now demanding high quality 
products meeting international standards from internationally recognised suppliers. 
 
Finally the sheer size of the demand in India is a significant incentive for the industry 
to build competitiveness.  
  
Firm strategy, structure and rivalry 
The industry for heavy-duty coatings is likely to do well according to Porter’s view on 
firm strategy as most major players in the industry are MNEs and working for MNEs 
in India is perceived as providing added prestige and opportunities (Grant, 1991). 
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It is already a very competitive industry in India, as for the most of the world, with 
great pressure on prices. In line with Porter’s theory this means that it is very 
important for the industry to develop improved and/or new products and processes to 
obtain an advantageous degree of differentiation.  
 
Related and supporting industries 
The paint industry is only expected to have very limited benefit from spill over 
technologies from India’s steel, pharmaceutical and shipping industries, but all the 
actors in the heavy-duty coatings industry will instead rely on their own R&D from 
global centres. 
HEMPEL’s competitors already established with manufacturing plants in India have 
chosen to locate themselves in very different parts of India. With no major incentive 
for HEMPEL to act differently it is unlikely that the industry will create a cluster such 
as the Silicon Valley for IT or Detroit for car manufacturing. 
  
6.3 Porter’s five forces 
When companies are faced with strategic decisions such as entering into new 
markets or significantly expanding activities in existing markets it is essential to know 
the strength of the competition to evaluate the potential for decent profits. Porter 
(1980) argues that too many managers only focus on the immediate competitors and 
neglect the other main factors that will influence potential profits in an industry. The 
below figure 6.7 shows Porter’s five forces for the heavy-duty coatings market in 
India where increased strength within each force is likely to result in reduced profits. 
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Figure 6.7: Own creation based on Porter’s five forces (1980) 
 
Rivalry among existing firms 
The industry is dominated by an oligopoly with the same MNEs competing in most 
other major markets around the world. They are not very different in terms of size 
and power, so there is a rather intense battle for positions. The various companies 
are trying to differentiate themselves from the pack, but most coatings are often 
viewed as commodities with the price competition that brings. The switching costs 
are quite low so it is relatively easy for one company to dump prices and win 
business to gain market share if they so desire. 
It is often costly to close down rather capital-intensive operations and some MNEs 
seem to hang on despite the absence of profits in order to maintain their global 
network or simply due to the management’s own loyalty to the particular business 
(Porter, 1980). 
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When one company tries to increase prices to decent levels another is always on the 
rampage to capture market share and this difference in strategies are for sure 
hurting the overall profitability of the industry. 
 
Bargaining power of suppliers 
For many raw materials the suppliers are very large organisations. This is in part due 
to a consolidation within the last decade and further consolidation is expected 
(Eggers, 2006). Certain advanced products require specialised raw materials, which 
only one or two suppliers can provide. This will naturally place the suppliers in a 
strong position, which can compromise the profits of the industry. Porter (1980) is 
assigning less power to the suppliers of commodities, but I will argue it depends on 
the type of commodity. The immediate suppliers of scarce natural resources such as 
oil, copper and zinc may not have much bargaining power, but the initial suppliers 
do. OPEC for example has a lot of power to manipulate prices and the end effect is 
that the paint industry is forced to buy at whatever given level, which presently has a 
huge impact on the industry profits.  
 
Bargaining power of buyers 
There are only a limited number of ship owners, ship management companies and 
industrial customers for heavy-duty coatings in India. The majority and the most 
attractive medium and large sized customers are therefore always chased by all the 
suppliers, which are thereby involuntarily providing the customers with strong 
bargaining power. There has been significant consolidation especially in the shipping 
industry and purchasing alliances have been built to achieve even more weight. As 
for the suppliers further consolidation is also expected on the buyer side (Eggers, 
2006). 
 
Individual orders for coatings commonly span from tens of thousands to hundreds of 
thousands US$ so a few per cent savings can reach significant amounts, which 
means that the buyers have a keen interest in bargaining down prices for coatings 
rather than e.g. the office stationary.  
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Threat of new entrants 
A new entrant will either have to start their production and R&D on a large scale or 
risk being less competitive. The customers valuing most products on terms with 
commodities will however seldom buy from other companies than the existing key 
players, so a new entrant will have a rough start with high marketing/promotion 
costs. The initial capital requirements are therefore expected to be significant. 
 
The increased use of patents for advanced coatings makes it impossible for new 
entrants to directly copy most recent technology and more difficult/costly to develop 
their own product range. 
 
A large part of the Protective Coatings segment is an international business where 
foreign engineering companies specify which coatings the sub-contractor in India 
must use. In the Marine Coatings segment the Indian vessels are trading and 
docking for repairs all around the world. It is therefore very difficult for a new entrant 
without a global network to succeed in these markets. 
 
Threat of substitutes products/services 
Coatings have for many years provided the most cost-efficient way to protect steel 
structures from corrosion and the bottom of ships from fouling. Various new 
technologies sometimes appear and capture small niche markets, but there does not 
seem to be any better solutions than coatings for the foreseeable future. 
 
Stainless steel is now used instead of regular steel for certain purposes, but due to 
the significantly higher cost stainless steel and other substitutes are unlikely to make 
any real dent in the increasing consumption of steel for the same foreseeable future. 
 
6.4 Market potential 
Marine maintenance 
Based on data from Lloyd’s Register Fairplay (2006) and using HEMPEL’s own 
conversion table the present potential in the marine maintenance market in India is 
estimated at EUR 14.9 million. 
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Similarly to many other areas India are lacking behind China when it comes to 
development of the Maritime sector. The main causes are believed to be the 
stronger shipping expertise in China, especially from owners and ship managers 
based in Hong Kong, and naturally the heavy bureaucracy in India (TradeWinds, 
2006b). Despite the slower pace India’s shipping industry is making healthy profits 
and numerous articles highlight most companies’ actions to build new vessels or buy 
second-hand vessels from the market (TradeWinds, 2006c). 
 
In addition to the internal growth foreign companies are keen on the Indian shipping 
market. The Danish shipping company Nord Scan Line was the first company to start 
up a domestic Indian shipping company (TradeWinds, 2006d) and international ship 
management companies are moving part of their operations to India. Much of the 
technical staff within ship management companies in Hong Kong and Singapore is 
Indian nationals so when the international ship management companies move to 
India they can capture both a growing market and cost reductions. Much of the crew 
aboard the worldwide fleet is Indian nationals, which also present a large pool of 
fresh talent. The slow improvement of the business environment is however a 
concern for companies and one of the largest ship management companies in 
Singapore, Executive Ship Management, is therefore only cautiously moving part of 
their fleet to India (Teeka, 2006). Other companies such as Barber Ship 
Management from Malaysia, Fleet Management and Eurasia from Hong Kong and 
ASP Ship Management from Australia have already moved part of their fleets to 
India. 
 
Marine new building 
According to Lloyd’s Register Fairplay (2006) India has 65 shipyards, but many of 
them are very small and inefficient yards. With yards around the world filling up due 
to great demand more owners are ordering in India attracted by shorter delivery 
times and lower costs. The Indian order book has thereby increased from EUR 300 
million in 2002 to EUR 2 billion in 2006 according to Shipping Minister TR Baalu 
(TradeWinds, 2006e). To cater for the increased demand the Indian government is 
planning to invest EUR 163 million in Hindustan Shipyard, EUR 78 million in Hooghly 
Dock & Port Engineers and build two major new shipyards with one on each coast. 
 
   Page 37 
 
 
The private yards are also on the move. ABG Shipyard is setting up a new shipyard 
facility (ABG, 2006), Bharati Shipyard is going for an expansion soon after their 
acquisition of Pinky Shipyard (Bharati, 2006), Larsen & Toubro has recently 
established a new shipyard in Hazira (Hindu Business Line, 2006), the new Pipavav 
Shipyard claims to have secured India’s largest commercial shipbuilding contract for 
18 container vessels (TradeWinds, 2006f) and Chowgule has moved from building of 
smaller coastal-going ships to the larger sea-going ships demanded by international 
buyers. 
 
Protective 
The growing population and economic development with a booming manufacturing 
sector in India are creating a huge need for improved infrastructure such as roads, 
ports, railways, bridges and the energy demands will be served by new oil, natural 
gas, coal, nuclear and wind power installations. It is very difficult to estimate the 
potential from so many different unstructured industries, but a consultant report from 
Global Industry Analysis Inc. (2004) from California in the U.S. suggests a potential 
for HEMPEL of EUR 77,886,538 in 2007 with a 5.5% annual increase. This 
estimation has excluded the many very small businesses still predominantly using 
the more basic lower quality paints from small local suppliers and the estimate is 
judged by P.B. Sasikumar, Sales Manager of HEMPEL (India) to be very realistic. 
 
EUR  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Marine maintenance       14,919,667       15,814,847    16,763,738    17,769,562     18,835,736 
Marine new building         5,544,330        6,375,980      7,332,376      8,065,614       8,710,863 
Protective       73,826,102       77,886,538    82,170,297    86,689,664     91,457,596 
Total India       94,290,099     100,077,365  106,266,411  112,524,840   119,004,195 
 
Table 6.8: Market potential for Marine & Protective in India, sources: (Lloyd’s Register, 2006) & (GIA, 2004) 
 
6.5 Competition 
Porter’s 5 forces in section 6.3 dealt with the strength of HEMPEL’s competitors in 
India whereas this section will explain how the competitors are operating in India in 
terms of location, type of company, size of operation etc. 
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Much literature is explaining different views on the relationship between foreign 
direct investments and strategic rivalry. Knickerbocker (1973) conducted a thorough 
analysis of 187 large U.S. companies to build a theory claiming that companies in an 
oligopoly will mirror each other’s FDIs to ensure that one company does not achieve 
significant advantages compared to the other. His theory is founded on uncertainty 
and risk-aversion within the oligopolistic companies. Head et al (2002) supports 
Knickerbocker’s theory given risk-aversion, however, they argue that companies 
which are risk-neutral will be less inclined to follow their competitors abroad. If their 
competitors have moved into a location before them it will reduce their potential 
benefits and they will be likely to search for another location. 
 
As mentioned in section 6.3 HEMPEL is part of an oligopoly not only in India, but 
also on a worldwide scene, and thereby in a so-called multipoint competition where 
MNEs battle in different regional markets. The below competitor details will not be 
used to promote that HEMPEL does the same or the opposite, but rather used as 
one piece in the puzzle that will form a recommendation later in this dissertation. 
 
International Paint 
International Paint has chosen to build their factory in Bangalore and they are using 
the same facilities to house their main office. An office in Mumbai supports this main 
office and they are including their office in Colombo, Sri Lanka as part of their Indian 
operations (International Paint, 2006). Further to these official offices they maintain 6 
representative offices around India with sales personnel working from their homes 
(Sasikumar, 2006). In terms of staff they are by far the largest among HEMPEL’s 
competitors with 148 employees, however, a part of this force is working on the 
powder coating market where the HEMPEL group is not active. On the markets 
where HEMPEL is active International Paint is estimating to sell 1.8 million litres for 
the Marine segment and 3.5 million litres for the Protective segment in 2006. 
Assuming that International Paint is achieving the same price levels as HEMPEL this 
would correspond to approximately EUR 16.17 million, which excludes their sales of 
powder coatings. The company is a 100% FDI set-up wholly owned by International 
Paint (Satesh, 2006). 
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Jotun 
Jotun’s main office is in Mumbai and they have a second office in Chennai. They 
have one factory in Daman, but this factory is only serving the market for powder 
coatings. As per the Norwegian financial newspaper, Dagens Næringsliv (Jotun, 
2006), Jotun has already decided on a plot of land in Pune to build two production 
units. One unit will produce powder coatings and the other coatings for the Marine, 
Protective and Decorative markets. Jotun will invest EUR 15 million with the 
construction starting in 2007 and expected completion in the second quarter of 2008. 
Group Executive Vice President for Jotun Coatings Esben Hersve’s logic seems to 
support the Uppsala stage theory: "India wishes to build more ships, and well-known 
shipping companies, who are already our customers, are in the process of 
establishing themselves there. We have been selling in India for a while now, so 
building the factories is a natural development". Jotun’s turnover is approximately 
EUR 12.5 million including sales of powder coatings and they hope to have an 
annual turnover around EUR 75 million by 2016. Jotun estimates to sell 1.38 million 
litres only for the Marine and Protective segment, which means that this part of their 
business contributes with revenues of approximately EUR 4.21 million. They 
presently have 35 employees, but this is naturally expected to increase significantly. 
Jotun’s set-up is a 100% FDI wholly-owned by the Jotun group (Lathesh, 2006). 
 
Sigma 
Sigma has their main office in Mumbai supported by 3 offices in Cochin, Chennai 
and Visakhapatnam (Sigma, 2006). They have outsourced the production of simple 
products to the local company Coromandel Paints based in Visakhapatnam and are 
importing the more advanced products from their factory in Malaysia and the 
Netherlands. Sigma has 45 employees in India, which naturally is significantly lower 
than International Paint due to the outsourcing of production. They expect to sell 
2.31 million litres for the Marine and 1.38 million litres for the Protective segment, 
which would give them an approximate turnover of EUR 11.25 million. They are 
operating as a branch office belonging to their regional head office in Singapore 
(George, 2006). 
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Chugoku 
Chugoku’s office in Mumbai is a liaison office under Chugoku Marine Paints 
(Singapore) Pte Ltd (Chugoku, 2006) from where their paints are exported to India in 
a similar manner to HEMPEL’s present set-up. They have a budget of EUR 1.83 
million in 2006 after achieving approximately EUR 1.53 in 2005 and they presently 
have 13 employees (Sasikumar, 2006).  
 
  
Budget/Estimate 
for 2006 
Turnover Offices Factories 
Type of 
company Employees
International 
Paint 
EUR 16 mill. 
(excluding 
powder coatings) 
Bangalore      
Mumbai        
+ 6 home 
offices 1 in Bangalore 
100% 
FDI 148 
Sigma EUR 11.25 mill. 
Mumbai        
Cochin         
Chennai        
Visakhapatnam
Outsourced to 
local company in 
Visakhapatnam 
100% 
FDI 45 
Jotun 
EUR 4.14 mill. 
(excluding 
powder coatings) 
Mumbai      
Chennai 
2 in Pune (start 
Jan 2007) 
Branch 
Office 35 
Hempel EUR 2.58 mill. Mumbai None 
Liaison 
office 9 
Chugoku EUR 1.83 mill. Mumbai None 
Liaison 
office 13 
 
Table 6.9: Competitor overview based on various sources mentioned above 
 
Some competitors are more established in India than HEMPEL at present time, but 
their foundation and brick-walling of customers are not yet strong enough to block a 
strategic move from HEMPEL. 
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7 Analysis of HEMPEL 
7.1 Business Foundation, Strategy and Goals 
Joergen Christian Hempel founded HEMPEL in Copenhagen, Denmark 4 July 1915. 
Whenever a ship required maintenance in those days the crew would mix their own 
paint, which of course resulted in great variances in both quality and colour. Just 20 
years of age Joergen Christian Hempel saw an opportunity to do this better and 
started his company with a mere Danish kroner 300 or EUR 40 to his name. He 
became the youngest licensed wholesaler in Denmark and opened his first factory 
one year later utilizing an old coffee grinder able of producing 50 kilograms of paint 
(HEMPEL’s Annual Report, 2005). In comparison a standard production batch of 
paint today is around 7,000 kilograms. By centralising production, standardising raw 
materials and formulas he managed to deliver products with a consistent good 
quality and uniform colours. The products and services quickly became a success 
with the growing Danish fleet of ships. 
 
 
Pictures 7.1, 7.2 & 7.3: Mr J.C. Hempel and his first factory in Denmark, source: HEMPEL’s Annual Report 2005 
 
Business thrived and at the age of 53 Joergen Christian Hempel created the J.C. 
Hempel Foundation 30 November 1948. He made the foundation the sole 
shareholder of HEMPEL A/S, which in turn fully or partly owns all subsidiaries and 
associates in the HEMPEL Group.  
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Picture 7.4: HEMPEL’s ownership & management structure, source: HEMPEL’s internal training material HOT 
 
It became well known especially in the Danish media that certain family members 
wanted a piece of this significant business, but to safeguard the future of the 
company he gave the foundation the responsibility to preserve and further develop 
the global HEMPEL business. He remained the chairman of the board of trustees 
until his death 30 January 1986. 
 
HEMPEL is thus a privately owned company and as mentioned on the main website 
www.hempel.com the assets, which constitute the basic capital of the foundation, 
cannot be sold or otherwise change ownership as long as the foundation is in 
existence. In a few countries, such as e.g. China, Croatia, Saudi Arabia, UAE etc., 
HEMPEL has started the businesses with local partners, but most commonly 
HEMPEL are allowed to control the management side of the business. 
This is in my opinion providing HEMPEL with the luxury of certain stability, ability to 
act fast and opportunity to think long term that some publicly listed companies may 
not enjoy to the same degree. 
Since the foundation does not have to distribute profits in form of dividends to 
individual shareholders it is able to re-invest profits for the further growth of the 
company and follow Joergen Christian Hempel’s decision to distribute a certain 
share every year for charity. As such DKK 2 million (approximately EUR 270,000) 
were given for the recent Tsunami relief efforts and many causes of different nature 
are supported e.g. the Danish Olympic Sailing Team, the Handicap Yachting Union, 
the Royal Danish Theatre, arts and concerts especially at the Anneberg Cultural 
Centre, young people in form of scholarships etc. 
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The company quickly expanded to other countries and HEMPEL is today a true MNE 
active in 83 countries with 21 factories, 47 sales offices, 3 R&D centres, more than 
130 stock points and employing approximately 3,500 people all around the world. 
This number of staff takes centre stage in the recently released new mission 
statement that reads as follows: “By combining an innovative environment with 
resourceful and committed employees, HEMPEL delivers and supports the most 
efficient coating solutions” (Eggers, 2006). 
  
The Group is continuing to set new records in terms of volume sold and as it can be 
seen from the below graph displaying the external sales in litres HEMPEL managed 
to sell 227 million litres in 2005. Based on 2004 figures (Arentsen, 2006) and the 
recent increase in sales HEMPEL’s estimated market share of turnover is now 12-
13%. 
 
Graphs 7.5, 7.6 & 7.7, source: HEMPEL’s annual report 2005 
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Despite the lower turnovers in 2003 and 2004, predominantly caused by the fall in 
the US Dollar, it is clear that HEMPEL is increasing its business, but when 
comparing the developments to the last graph on Net Profit After Tax it is equally 
clear that HEMPEL has an issue with profitability. The world is constantly changing 
and the top management decided that it was time for a major review of the company 
strategy. 
 
Strategy and Goals 
During 2006 HEMPEL embarked on the most comprehensive strategy exercise in 
the history of the company where 12 strategy work groups produced more than 800 
pages of detailed material mapping out HEMPEL’s present position and giving 
recommendations for the future (HEMPEL Management Briefing, 2006). The end 
result was a new strategy for 2007-2011 called ‘One Hempel – Everywhere’. 
 
The strategy work concluded that HEMPEL’s main challenges are coming from 3 
categories: External pressures, industry developments and internal complexity. 
  
The external pressures are e.g. increasing environmental legislation with 
requirements for product testing and increasing raw material costs, which are 
unlikely to return to previous levels.  
 
The general coatings industry is maturing and most products are increasingly 
regarded as commodities with the intense competition on price that creates. The 
product life cycles are shortening allowing for less time to cover R&D expenses and 
there is an increased consolidation of both suppliers and customers. 
 
The internationalisation of HEMPEL has created a too de-centralised organization 
with a need for global alignment of processes and standardisation of systems. 
HEMPEL is operating in 5 main segments: Marine, Protective, Yacht, Container and 
Decorative. The Marine segment consists of the world’s merchant fleet, navy 
vessels, fishing vessels, smaller coastal going vessels etc. The Protective segment 
covers all industrial projects such as refineries, oilrigs, power plants, wind towers, 
cranes, bridges etc. The Decorative segment covers a careful selection of countries 
where HEMPEL are promoting house paint to be sold through retail shops or directly 
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to contractors building larger housing projects. The Yacht and Container segments 
are also only marketed in a few selected countries. These 5 segments require quite 
different approaches in terms of management. The Marine is e.g. regarded as a 
global business demanding a global management or co-ordination whereas the 
Protective is regarded as a more regional business to be managed more 
independently by the regional management. Despite the previously mentioned 
limited ownership by partners there have been significant conflicts of interests, which 
add to the internal complexity. How this affects the recommendations for the Indian 
set-up will be explored further in section 9. 
 
It was decided that HEMPEL needs to grow to benefit from scale, but very 
importantly it should be done at a profitability level better than achieved in the last 
few years. The relative savings from scale combined with improved internal 
efficiencies and the higher profitability will then allow for further investments in R&D 
and in the people of HEMPEL enabling a significant degree of differentiation 
(Eggers, 2006). 
 
The strategy specified HEMPEL’s vision through a very ambitious goal: 
 
“No 1 in 2012” 
 
To make it a bit more tangible it was broken down by segment goals as follows: 
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Figure 7.8: HEMPEL’s strategic objectives, source: HEMPEL Group Strategy 2007-2011 (Eggers, 2006) 
 
As mentioned earlier HEMPEL started out solely focusing on paints for the maritime 
industry and this business was for many years the most important segment. There 
are of course a limited number of ships in the world and with a market share of 17% 
in this niche market the strategy does not call for growth in market share, but rather 
growth in Earnings Before Interest & Tax (EBIT) margin from 8% in 2006 to 14% in 
2007. In short, this should be achieved through a global approach where unprofitable 
business is discontinued and efforts are re-directed towards the higher end of the 
market where customers are willing to pay a certain premium for superior quality and 
service. 
 
Very interesting for this dissertation is however the fact that the turnover for the 
Protective segment is predicted to grow by more than 70% by 2011. In 2005 
HEMPEL’s market share in the Protective segment grew to around 7% (HEMPEL’s 
Protective Objective 
“Hempel is a profitable no. 1 in market share globally 
by end 2011”
Decorative Objective 
“Hempel holds a profitable top position in market share 
(EUR) in selected niches by end 2011” 
Marine Objective 
“Hempel is number 1 by EBIT margin globally by end 
2011”
Yacht Objective 
“Hempel is the fastest growing, profitable supplier 
2007-2011”
Container Objective 
“Hempel is number 1 by EBIT margin globally 2006-
2011”
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Annual Report, 2005) and in 2006 it is forecasted to contribute 45% of HEMPEL’s 
total EBIT compared to the Marine contributing 40% (Eggers, 2006). 
 
The strategy calls for a global focus on 3 sub-segments: Down stream Oil & Gas 
(petrochemical/refineries), power generation and infrastructure/civil construction. 
Besides these sub-segments the individual regions will identify the attractive sub-
segments in their part of the world and prepare separate strategies for those. The 
product assortment will be adjusted slightly and HEMPEL’s identity as a major player 
in the Protection segment will be promoted. 
 
On a Group level the goal is to increase the Protective market share from the 7% in 
2005 to 13.5% in 2011 and end up with the same EBIT margin in 2011 as forecasted 
for 2006. 
For HEMPEL in the Asia Pacific (APAC) region the goals are equally ambitious. For 
the sake of good order please note that HEMPEL in China operates as an 
independent region, but that India is under the responsibility of HEMPEL (APAC). 
HEMPEL (APAC)’s protective target is to achieve 25% market share, which means 
an increase from a budget target in 2006 of EUR 18.11 million to EUR 46.29 million 
in 2011 (Wee, 2006). 
 
7.2 International presence 
After J.C. Hempel established his company in Denmark in 1915 he quickly began to 
search for new markets and the internationalisation process started early for 
HEMPEL with the first agency established in Spain in 1917 (J.C. Hempel 
Foundation, 1994). One year later the first HEMPEL paint produced outside 
Denmark rolled out of the factory from the licensed manufacturing unit in Sweden. 
 
It has not been possible to retrieve data on all of HEMPEL’s ventures around the 
world, but the use of books like the one referred to above, “65 years with Hempel” 
(Skaaning, 1980), HEMPEL’s intranet, information from the marketing and 
communication departments in Singapore and Denmark, interviews with senior 
managers in HEMPEL and representatives from the J.C. HEMPEL Foundation, 
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especially Erik Soender who worked with J.C. Hempel, has provided a good picture 
of HEMPEL’s internationalisation process. 
 
Geographical/psychic distance 
The expansion is very similar to the pattern theorised by Johanson & Wiedersheim-
Paul (1975) where companies choose their markets according to geographical and 
psychic distance combined with market potential. By splitting HEMPEL’s 
internationalisation up in three waves the below figure 7.9 shows how HEMPEL’s 
first wave of expansion consisted of the Scandinavian neighbours Sweden, Norway 
and Finland plus Spain, Germany and Belgium. Spain may not fit so well with the 
theory, but the expansion here was influenced by J.C. Hempel’s personal relations 
with the agent in Spain. 
 
 The second wave continued until World War II at what point HEMPEL had 7 
factories, 22 stock points and 27 agents around the world. These agents were in 
addition to the above situated in countries such as France, Italy, United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Iceland, Greece, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Japan, Egypt, Panama, 
Hong Kong and South Africa. The trend with limited geographical and psychic 
distance is clear and the latter countries where chosen due to their market potential 
as frequently used ports on conventional shipping routes. 
 
With the most attractive (at the time) European countries covered the third wave is 
more influenced by psychic distance and market potential. One example is 
Singapore, which due to its language, education level, developed business 
environment etc., served as the first stop in Asia Pacific. The experiences in 
Singapore would help to reduce uncertainties and thereby be a stepping stone for 
expansion into countries less similar to Denmark. 
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Figure 7.9: Own creation of HEMPEL’s geographical expansion 
 
The establishment chain of the stage theory  
As the above section may have indicated HEMPEL also followed the gradually 
evolving chain of establishments suggested by Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul 
(1975) in most cases. When exports to the certain country reached a level, and a 
decent amount of knowledge had been obtained, an agent would be appointed to 
manage the business locally. As the business expanded further and HEMPEL’s 
uncertainty shrunk the agency contracts would generally be bought over or 
discontinued to pave the way for a sales subsidiary. The choice whether to have a 
manufacturing unit would then also depend on other factors such as import duties, 
transportation costs etc. (Soender, 2006).  
 
The below table 7.10 has been constructed based on information from the same 
sources as mentioned above. Since the data for many countries is not available, and 
a full list would be too comprehensive, the below table is merely intended to assist 
the understanding of HEMPEL’s internationalisation. 
1915-1925 
1926-1939 
No HEMPEL presence 
Hong Kong 
1940-today 
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When Where & How 
4 July 1915 
Joergen Christian Hempel establishes HEMPEL in Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
1917 Agency through José Arnou established in Spain 
1927 Sales subsidiary established in Gothenburg, Sweden 
1927 Joint Venture established with AB SYD FERNISS in Malmoe, Sweden 
1929 Sales subsidary established in Barcelona, Spain 
1929 Sales subsidiary established in Vilvoorde, Belgium 
1933 Sales subsidiary established in London, U.K. 
1935 Operations established in Hong Kong 
1936 Manufacturing established in Helsingborg, Sweden 
1940 Sales subsidiary established in Oslo, Norway 
1948 Sales subsidiary established in Rotterdam, Holland 
1948 Sales subsidiary established in Reykjavik, Iceland 
1949 Manufacturing established in London, U.K. 
1949 Sales subsidiary established in Piraeus, Greece 
1951 Manufacturing established in Reykjavik, Iceland 
1951 Sales subsidiary established in Germany 
1951 Sales subsidiary and manufacturing established in New York, U.S.A. 
1955 Agency established in Singapore 
1955 Agency established in Taiwan 
1956 Sales subsidiary established in Kobe, Japan 
1958 Sales subsidiary established in St. Crepin, France 
1960 Sales subsidiary established in Genoa, Italy 
1960 Sales subsidiary established in Valletta, Malta 
1963 Sales subsidiary established in Hamburg, Germany 
13 May 1963 Manufacturing established in Pinneberg, Germany 
1963 Sales subsidiary established in Montreal, Canada 
1964 Manufacturing established in Polinya, Spain 
1965 Sales subsidiary established in Helsinki, Finland 
1966 Sales subsidiary officially established in Kobe, Japan 
1965 Agency established in Bombay, India 
1966 Sales office established in Houston, U.S.A. 
1966 Joint Venture and manufacturing established in Kuwait 
1967 Sales subsidary and manufacturing established in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
13 March 1968 Agency in Melbourne, Australia 
1969 Joint Venture established in Dubai, U.A.E. 
1970 Sales subsidiary established in Lisbon, Portugal 
1970 
Joint Venture including manufacturing established with Kemijski 
Kombinat Chromos-Katran-Kutrilin in Umag, Croatia (then Yugoslavia) 
19 January 1973 Agency established in Indonesia 
30 January 1974 Joint Venture and manufacturing established in Dammam, Saudi Arabia 
1974 Sales subsidiary established in Curacao, Netherlands Antilles 
1974 Sales subsidiary established in Panama 
1974 Sales subsidary and manufacturing established in Ecuador 
1974 Sales subsidiary established in Melbourne, Australia 
1975 Joint venture with Dongju established in Busan, South Korea 
1976 Sales subsidary and manufacturing established in Singapore 
7 July 1979 Sales subsidiary established in Malaysia 
2 February 1994 Sales subsidiary established in Taiwan 
1995 Representative office established in Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam 
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1997 Agency established in Thailand 
13 October 2000 Sales subsidiary in Busan, South Korea 
February 2003 Manufacturing established in Kluang, Malaysia 
2003 Sales subsidiary established in Thailand 
9 March 2006 Sales subsidiary in Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam 
6 July 2006 Manufacturing established in Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam 
 
Table 7.10: Own compilation of events related to HEMPEL’s internationalisation 
 
As HEMPEL expanded the business to all corners of the globe regional 
headquarters were established. The office in Singapore became the regional 
headquarter for Asia Pacific, excluding China, but including countries with a psychic 
distance or geographical location close to that of Singapore. For an overview of 
HEMPEL’s regional set-up and active countries included under the responsibility of 
HEMPEL (Asia Pacific) please refer to figures 7.11 and 7.12 below. 
 
 
 
 
Figures 7.11 and 7.12: Own creations based on organisation charts from HEMPEL’s Intranet 
 
HEMPEL HQ 
Americas Asia Pacific 
China 
Southern Europe 
Northern Europe Middle East West 
Middle East East 
Asia Pacific HQ (based in Singapore)
Singapore 
Myanmar 
Brunei 
Pakistan 
India 
Sri Lanka Bangladesh 
Philippines Thailand 
New Zealand South Africa 
Australia Vietnam 
Taiwan Malaysia 
Korea Indonesia 
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7.3 Past experiences and future direction for Hempel in India 
HEMPEL has had very mixed experiences in India. After Joergen Nissen, then 
Regional Manager Far East, had successfully coordinated the establishments in 
Singapore and Hong Kong he initiated a stock agent agreement with Bombay Paints 
in Mumbai in 1965. The initial objective was to serve the supplies to the ships of 
HEMPEL’s international customers when they traded the coast of India (Rasmussen, 
2006). 
 
Bombay Paints was owned by Mota Tschudasama, a well-connected businessman 
married to an Indian princess, whose influence was useful to cut through India’s thick 
layer of red tape. 
 
After some years of good co-operation Bombay Paints became a sales agent in the 
early 1970’s to promote HEMPEL’s products for the Marine segment as a 
supplement to Bombay Paint’s own products for the Protective segment. The 
products were at that time exported from Denmark to India. 
 
In the mid 1970’s HEMPEL establishes a Joint Venture with Bombay Paint allowing 
them to produce HEMPEL products in India. The business continues to grow and by 
the mid 1980’s HEMPEL and Bombay Paints have secured approximately 90% 
market share of the marine segment according to Johnsen (2006). 
 
During the same period HEMPEL discovers that Bombay Paints are compromising 
HEMPEL’s strict quality standards by using non-approved raw materials and the 
relationship starts to deteriorate. Things turn worse in 1995 when Tschudasama sells 
Bombay Paints, including the license to produce and sell HEMPEL products, to the 
Moore family. This is of course against the written agreement, but since the Moore 
family appears to be a better match for HEMPEL, business is continued with the new 
partner. In the following years business declines as both parties have their focus 
directed elsewhere and in March 1999 the agreement with Bombay Paints is 
cancelled (Rasmussen, 2006). 
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For the next 6 months the small HEMPEL team operates out of the Technical 
Service Manager’s home until they are able to settle into the newly rented office in 
the Mahim area of Mumbai. In July 1999 HEMPEL obtains the license to operate a 
liaison office in India. In the years after 1999 regular evaluations of the potential of 
the Indian market is carried out, but analysis shows that growth especially in the 
Protective market will require some sort of production facility in India. At the same 
time market studies shows that the existing larger competitors to HEMPEL are 
having problems obtaining decent profits and it is therefore decided to stand by while 
monitoring the development (Vang, 2006). The steady growth in HEMPEL’s business 
in India, shown in the below table 7.13, combined with the positive developments in 
India’s business environment as a whole, has now resulted in a request from the 
management for a re-evaluation of HEMPEL’s options.   
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Litres 193,055 242,187 311,363 670,339 810,702 
Turnover EUR 595,059 678,367 914,049 1,957,184 2,532,208 
Gross profit 
EUR 136,402 197,083 417,828 549,528 791,394 
            
Number of 
staff 6 7 7 8 8 
 
Table 7.13: HEMPEL’s developing business in India 2001-2005 
 
7.4 Products 
Product Life Cycle 
As mentioned by Kotler and Armstrong (2001) Vernon’s product life cycle concept 
can be applied for a product class, product form or a brand. In this analysis it would 
not make sense to go through hundreds of different HEMPEL products, but rather 
establish the position of HEMPEL products as a class or category in Singapore and 
India respectively. 
 
In line with Vernon’s (1966) argumentation J.C. Hempel started his product 
development in safe and relatively certain surroundings in Denmark. When the 
products had reached a reasonable degree of standardization he was able to start 
production in other countries as can be seen in section 7.2. 
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HEMPEL has been in Singapore for more than 50 years and the high quality heavy-
duty protective coatings for the Marine and Protective segments have reached a 
stage of maturity. All reputable customers in Singapore have moved away from 
cheap inferior products from non-recognised suppliers and have for the last decades 
only used high quality products from internationally respected suppliers to meet 
international standards. 
 
The product life cycle is based on certain assumptions and should not be used in 
solitude. Internal efforts such as marketing and external forces such as increase in 
demand can breathe new life into a matured product. It will however not be 
reasonable to assume that marketing efforts can cause significant improvements and 
with the demand in Singapore expected to grow by a mere 2% annually (Global 
Industry Analysis Inc, 2004) there will be chances for only limited growth. 
 
In India the high quality heavy-duty protective coatings are however in the growth 
stage. Many customers have been using inferior low-cost coatings in an obvious 
attempt to save costs, but they are realizing that the high-end products will provide 
better value for money in the long run. Furthermore the customers of HEMPEL’s 
customers are increasingly international companies and they demand that their own 
standard specifications and/or internationally recognised products are used. 
 
According to Vernon the maturing demand in Singapore leads to standardisation 
which leads to price sensitivity. Producers such as HEMPEL could therefore 
consider moving their production to lower cost countries such as India where the 
local demand at the same time is on the rise (see figure 7.14). 
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Figure 7.14: Vernon’s PLC applied to the heavy-duty coatings markets in Singapore and India 
 
7.5 Value Creation 
In order to understand how HEMPEL is creating value the Value Chain by Porter 
(1985) will be used. The below model is useful to break the company’s end product 
down in categorised activities and assess if HEMPEL is able to obtain the degree of 
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differentiation outlined in the strategy and thereby the desired competitive 
advantage.  
 
Figure 7.15: Porter’s Value Chain, source: www.themanager.org 
 
For a very simple business it would have been beneficial to establish the value 
creation in absolute figures. For a complex operation like HEMPEL this would be a 
dissertation in itself. The Value Chain will instead be used to show where the value is 
created and at the same time evaluate which links in the chain are creating more or 
less value. 
 
As mentioned by Besanko et al (2004) there are two main ways a company can 
provide more value than its competitors. Either they have a value chain that is 
structurally different and better matched to the market; otherwise they have a value 
chain basically identical to their competitors where they then perform better within 
one or more of the activities. 
 
At the higher levels the main players in the global competitive environment for 
protective coatings utilise very similar value chain structures. For the companies in 
the individual countries such as India the value chains are however quite different. 
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In- and outbound logistics 
The logistics operation in HEMPEL (APAC) is very efficient, but it has to be as it is 
facing high expectations from the customers. Deliveries in the Asia Pacific region are 
expected on-time-in-full and anything less is simply not acceptable to the customers. 
HEMPEL has a strong global logistics network with more than 130 stock points 
around the world, which is valued by the customers as only one or two other 
suppliers can maintain a similar global delivery performance. This is nicely in line 
with a differentiation-strategy, however, long-term supply issues in a few major stock 
locations such as the U.S. should be solved faster to ensure that the higher value is 
maintained. 
  
HEMPEL in India can deliver smaller orders of standard items through a sales agent 
located in Kandla in Gujarat State, but the delivery capabilities are of course inferior 
compared to the major competitors who have production and much larger stock 
points in India. 
 
The logistics are estimated to account for 10% for the value created. 
 
Operations 
The production of heavy duty coatings is a relatively simple process, so it does not 
create a lot of value in itself. As mentioned in section 6.5 HEMPEL presently does 
not have a production facility in India and all products are imported through 
Singapore. On the positive side many customers in India have a moderate 
preference for imported products from recognized countries such as Singapore as 
they are perceived to be of a higher quality compared to products produced in India. 
On the negative side imported products are subject to the taxes and duties specified 
in table 6.3 in section 6.2.2 and since Indian manufacturers partly use cheaper 
locally sourced raw materials it becomes extremely difficult or even impossible for 
HEMPEL to compete on projects where the buyer is not duty-exempt. 
 
Companies included in the duty-exemption are companies exporting their finished 
product such as new building shipyards and engineering companies. Government 
companies such as the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) are also enjoying 
this benefit for a large part of their business. 
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This does not have a major impact on the marine business in relation to the marine 
strategy focusing on profitability, but it will exclude HEMPEL from the huge protective 
market in India which could help HEMPEL achieve the growth and scope outlined in 
the strategy. This issue will be discussed further in chapter 9. 
 
The production operations are estimated to account for 10% of the value creation. 
 
Marketing and Sales 
The marketing efforts for HEMPEL (India) are conducted from the regional marketing 
department based in Singapore. HEMPEL (India) is able to benefit from a 
professional marketing approach with the general advertising in industry-related 
magazines and newspapers. Furthermore HEMPEL (India) can use the regionally or 
globally produced brochures, leaflets, product data sheets etc. 
 
Since India has been a non-focus area for HEMPEL in the last few years there have 
however not been any marketing efforts directly aimed towards the Indian market. As 
mentioned by Porter (1986) there is homogenization of needs internationally, but as 
he warns this should definitely not mean a standardization of all international 
marketing. The present attention from HEMPEL towards India does not justify more 
marketing, but if HEMPEL wishes to increase the activities in India a reasonable 
share of customized marketing targeted at the Indian market is essential. 
 
On the sales side HEMPEL (India) only has 2 sales persons and 2 back office 
support staff. Unlike marketing they are very focused on the Indian market of course, 
but very importantly focused on only a few new-building yards together with the 
larger ship owners and ship management companies with ships trading outside 
Indian waters. 
The clear focus allows the sales to provide the customers with a close and 
personalized attention. The limited set-up in India naturally means that HEMPEL 
cannot serve most of the potential buyers of protective coatings in India, but the 
value created by the sales is significant. This is supported by the fact that the 2 sales 
persons in India are generating the same level of turnover, approximately EUR 1.3-
1.7 million, and margins as the sales persons in Singapore. 
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The marketing and sales are estimated to account for 25% of the value created. 
 
Service 
Joergen Christian Hempel’s motto was from the beginning “Quality & Service” and 
the global HEMPEL organisation has been trying to live by that motto ever since. In 
terms of service HEMPEL especially invests a lot of resources in the Technical 
Service. The technical service team consists of more than 400 Coating Advisors 
around the world (HEMPEL, 2006) trained to different levels. They are on-site where 
the coatings are applied and their main responsibility is to assist the customer with 
advice and guidance to reach the best possible result under the given 
circumstances.   
 
HEMPEL (India)’s technical service department (TSD) is made up of 1 TSD Manager 
and 4 Coating Advisors. Poor HR planning with regards to TSD has meant that 
HEMPEL in India has been short of technical staff when existing Coating Advisors 
left the company and/or when business increased as expected. For long periods of 
6-12 months HEMPEL could therefore not deliver the quality service normally 
provided until the new technical staff had reached a certain level of training and 
experience. 
 
This is due to the lack of global/regional HR management described below and the 
adversity to risk displayed by the Regional TSD Manager based in Singapore, who 
decides on the appropriate number of technical staff required to serve the business. 
The overall strategy is in place, but there is no service strategy to ensure that the 
end goals can be achieved as proposed by Chase et al. (2004). 
 
The staff in TSD is almost 100% occupied and they have problems even finding time 
to clear their leave and set aside time for development and training. On occasions 
the sales staff will have to go on-site in boiler suits to cover for the lack of available 
Coating Advisors. As highlighted by Chris O’Brien (2005) the 70% traffic intensity 
perceived to be optimal for the average business is also considered to be much 
better for HEMPEL in order to prevent loss of very valuable business and only save 
very little on costs. A fresh graduate from paint technology studies in Mumbai is 
presently paid around INR 10,000 or EUR 200 per month. 
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The technical service is a very important part of the total product package and the 
above combined with feedback from customers suggest that HEMPEL is not creating 
full value for its customers. It would be interesting to investigate this further by 
gathering information on competitor resources and a survey amongst the customers. 
It would then be possible to follow the recommendations by Radhika (2002) to 
benchmark HEMPEL’s value creation from this service against the competition. 
 
Based on the present situation the service is estimated to account for 20% of the 
value created, but this is for sure an area where added investment and planning can 
increase the value creation and even be a true competitive advantage for HEMPEL. 
 
Firm infrastructure (e.g. finance and accounting) 
The main responsibility for finance and accounting is placed with the regional 
Finance department in HEMPEL (Singapore). A Chartered Accountant in Mumbai 
assists them for local issues outside their area of competence and HEMPEL (India) 
is only handling small petty cash payments. 
 
One could argue that the finance and accounting do not add much value, but they 
are of course essential to any decent sized company and they help drive the 
business forward by keeping costs and transactions organised so sales and 
managers can pull reports to make decisions for the future. 
 
The finance and accounting are therefore estimated to create 5% of the value, which 
should be on par with competitors. 
 
Human resource management 
The main HRM concepts and goals argued by many researchers and scholars like 
Guest (1997), Armstrong (2000a), Armstrong (2000b), Tichy et al (1982) and Beer et 
al (1984) include linking HRM strategy with the overall company strategy, culture 
management, total quality, investing in people and knowledge management. In the 
HEMPEL (APAC) set-up all these areas fall under the responsibility of the 13 
functional managers. This is resulting in a lack of uniformity and a failure to leverage 
on the regional and global organisation. 
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The above literature suggest that the absence of the stated concepts means that 
HEMPEL (APAC)’s HR department is not performing HRM, but rather the basic 
elements of the “old school” Personnel Management e.g. maintaining employment 
contracts etc.  
 
Based on interviews with anonymous sources 10 out of 11 employees feel that most 
or all of the above concepts are missing from HEMPEL (APAC)’s HR department 
and its performance is given an average rating of 1.4 on a scale from 1 to 5 where 5 
is the highest possible score. One could argue that the department actually destroys 
value rather than create value, but in combination with the work of the 13 functional 
managers the Human Resource Management is estimated to account for 5% of the 
value created. 
 
Technology development 
HEMPEL’s R&D is a significant value creator. Most products require constant 
development to stay competitive and completely new products must reach the 
market on a regular basis for HEMPEL to keep or enhance its position. Some 
products have to protect major assets for many years e.g. a Very Large Crude 
Carrier oil tanker costing around USD 130 million should be protected using a couple 
of layers in tenths of millimetres thickness. Without coatings, marvels of engineering 
such as huge ships, bridges, buildings etc., would crumble to a premature death. 
Products were previously required to keep the bottom of ships clean from fouling 
organisms such as grass and barnacles for periods up to 5 years – market pressure 
is now calling for 7.5 or even 10 years. 
 
HEMPEL is annually spending around EUR 7.4 million in R&D for the Marine and 
Protective segments. This accounts for approximately 1.64% of the turnover in 
Marine and 1.13% of the turnover in Protective respectively (Wiese, 2006). These 
investments are to a large extent focused on the Fouling Control products, which are 
generally the most important products in the marine buyer’s decision-making 
process. A recent success within this area is the biocide-free silicone-based non-
stick fouling release coating HEMPASIL for the bottom of ships. Many competitors 
are still struggling with this technology, so here HEMPEL has achieved a significant 
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advantage. With the aim of launching one new-to-the-world product every year 
(Eggers, 2006) the activities in R&D seem well in line with the overall strategy. 
 
The R&D has ensured that HEMPEL has the products required to be competitive in 
India and it is estimated that they account for 20% of the value created. 
  
Procurement 
HEMPEL is one of the largest suppliers of heavy-duty coatings in the world. 
International Paints are though significantly larger and they enjoy the benefit of 
belonging to the Akzo Nobel group of companies totalling a turnover almost 20 times 
that of HEMPEL. They certainly have the benefit of scale and one cannot oversee 
the fact that they enjoy the benefits of vertical integration with their chemical division 
supplying 174 products for the paints and coatings industry (Akzo Nobel, 2006). 
As mentioned by Besanko et al (2004) this could provide benefits such as lower 
transaction costs, use of industry knowledge, more secure inputs etc., but on the 
other hand it is likely to influence their choice of supplier even if the material could be 
sourced cheaper from competing suppliers. 
 
According to Susanne Lovgreen (2006), HEMPEL’s Group Purchasing Director, 
HEMPEL is due to its size getting very competitive prices on raw materials and is 
therefore neither at a significant disadvantage nor advantage compared to major 
competitors. Lovgreen’s department had recently obtained confidential information 
on several of our major suppliers with regards to their prices to HEMPEL’s main 
competitors and they showed that HEMPEL in many cases actually is invoiced lower 
prices than International Paints. 
 
The procurement is estimated to account for 5% of the value created. 
 
7.6 Financial analysis 
The following section will provide a brief overview of HEMPEL’s performance and 
financial situation. As mentioned by Brealey & Myers (2004) such an analysis can be 
based on a few key financial figures and ratios. The more advanced tools of financial 
analysis such as incremental cash flows, present value and market risk will be 
   Page 63 
 
 
included in the more comprehensive NPV analysis attached to this dissertation as 
appendix 4. The NPV analysis is intended to assist in the decision making process of 
HEMPEL’s top management with regards to a potential investment for expansion in 
India.  
 
The areas included in this section will be the financing and liquidity ratios which, 
together with the Internal and Sustainable growth rates, can help clarify if HEMPEL 
is financially able to support increased activities in India. 
 
The coating industry consists of companies of very different size and many 
companies are operating in markets where HEMPEL is not active e.g. automotive 
paints, commodity chemicals, pharmaceuticals, cement etc. In order to give meaning 
to the figures in this analysis it was therefore chosen to view HEMPEL’s figures over 
a 5-year period and benchmark against Jotun, who are a main competitor to 
HEMPEL and the closest in terms of product assortment and ownership structure. 
 
Current condition 
As discussed in section 7.1 HEMPEL has achieved a significant growth in turnover 
during the last couple of years and interestingly it is almost identical to the growth 
achieved by Jotun as shown in the below graph 7.16. Since Jotun is much more 
active in the high margin Decorative market it is not surprising that their gross profit 
margin in general is higher than HEMPEL’s. It is however worrying that HEMPEL’s 
margin is reducing and reducing faster than that of Jotun as can be seen in graph 
7.17. 
 
 
Graph 7.16: Based on data from annual reports Graph 7.17: Based on data from annual reports 
Net Sales
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
800,000
900,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
EU
R
 '0
00
Hempel Jotun
Gross Profit Margin
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Hempel Jotun
   Page 64 
 
 
The faster decrease in GP margin from 2002 to 2005 for HEMPEL means that 
Jotun’s net profit after tax surpasses HEMPEL’s rather flat graph below. If HEMPEL 
in the same period had a decrease similar to that of Jotun of 5.3 percentage points 
HEMPEL would, ceteris paribus, have achieved a similar net profit after tax. 
However, when applying the commonly used performance measure of return on 
equity it is obvious that HEMPEL’s management is achieving a better return than 
Jotun considering the equity available to them. 
 
 
Graph 7.18: Based on data from annual reports Graph 7.19: Based on data from annual reports 
 
HEMPEL has at the end of 2005 a net working capital of EUR 193.6 million, which is 
EUR 26.4 million more than Jotun. Considering Jotun’s additional requirement for 
cash due to their turnover, which is almost 30% higher than HEMPEL’s, one could 
assume that HEMPEL comfortably could invest the less than EUR 1 million in an 
expansion in India should it wish to do so. In order to analyse this further it is useful 
to find out how much HEMPEL has borrowed and how liquid it is. 
 
Financing and liquidity ratios 
HEMPEL has a gearing (debt / (debt + equity)) of 37.5%, which is significantly higher 
than Jotun’s at 19.7%. However, if this is converted to a debt-equity ratio HEMPEL’s 
0.6 is significantly lower than the 0.9 for the chemical industry as a whole (Yahoo, 
2006). HEMPEL would certainly be in problems if there was not enough means to 
pay the regular interest payments on the above debt. It is therefore interesting to 
look at the times-interest-earned ratio, which for HEMPEL shows that it can pay its 
net interest 20.5 times over if required.  
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If HEMPEL should decide to take up short term borrowings e.g. to finance an 
expansion in India it is very beneficial to have a fast track to cash. HEMPEL’s current 
ratio of 1.86 and quick ratio of 1.39 have been quite stable over the years and 
consistently higher than Jotun’s. As mentioned by Alyson McLintock (2005) a current 
ratio between 1 and 2 is acceptable depending on the type of business, so it is safe 
to say that HEMPEL is well positioned with 1.86. After deducting the stock and work 
in progress HEMPEL still has a ratio of 1.39 so no cause for alarm there. 
 
 
Graph 7.20: Based on data from annual reports Graph 7.21: Based on data from annual reports 
 
Internal and Sustainable Growth Rates 
The internal growth rate is a measure for how much growth a company can absorb 
without sourcing for external funding (Brealey & Myers, 2004) and it is calculated by 
dividing the retained earnings by the net assets. In HEMPEL’s case this results in an 
internal growth rate of 3.3%. The dividends are most commonly an important signal 
to the market and listed companies will usually try to keep their dividend payouts 
stable. HEMPEL, being a private company, can however utilise their earnings more 
freely and the dividends are therefore very fluctuating as confirmed by Martin 
Engelmand Olsen (2006) from HEMPEL’s Group Finance. According to Olsen the 
annual dividend to the foundation is adjusted to cater for the need for investments in 
the business on one side and the foundation’s need for cash on the other side. The 
dividends are e.g. used for external investments to spread risks, charitable purposes 
etc. and on average 70% of the profit is paid out as dividends to the fund. 
 
The sustainable growth rate is a measure for how much a company can grow with 
additional external funds, but maintaining their gearing (Brealey & Myers, 2004). It is 
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try to limit the additional external funding according to the increase in equity from 
retained earnings. The sustainable growth rate is calculated by multiplying the 
retained earnings by the plowback ratio. The rate for HEMPEL is 5.6% based on the 
above mentioned 70% dividend. 
 
The above thereby confirms that HEMPEL is in a healthy financial situation and that 
the Group would not have problems financing a gradually increasing business of a 
decent size such as the one laid out in the NPV analysis in Appendix 4. 
 
8 SWOT 
 
Strengths 
HEMPEL is a MNE with more than 90 years of experience and more than 40 of 
those years have been with presence in India. The gradual internationalisation of 
HEMPEL means that the organisation has built up expertise in countries with various 
characteristics similar to those in India and the years in India have brought 
knowledge that significantly reduces risks associated with expansion. 
It has managed to achieve a global market share of 12-13% and thereby be one of 
the largest suppliers in its business segments through a very good reputation 
building on quality products and service. These quality products fit well with the 
environment and demands in India, but further development of the Fouling Control 
products are required to increase competitiveness. HEMPEL has never been the 
cheapest supplier, but provides good value for money and it is thereby in the 
acceptable price range for the majority of customers and projects.  
The global coverage is very strong, but the distribution effectiveness in some 
countries should be improved to take full benefit from this competitive advantage. 
HEMPEL is privately owned, which provides stability to set more long term goals. 
The profit margins are under pressure, but HEMPEL is growing profitably with a 
healthy availability of capital and financial stability. 
HEMPEL in India has a quite small but capable and motivated work force with a few 
employees having significant experience. Their coaching, assisted by other staff in 
the region, will help new employees settle in faster. 
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Many raw materials are purchased from global suppliers and HEMPEL is enjoying 
economies of scale for much of the purchasing. It is however important that 
HEMPEL in India achieves good growth rates in the coming years to enjoy 
economies of scale in production with bigger batches and dilution of fixed costs. 
 
Weaknesses 
Poor management of the Technical Service Department has resulted in several long 
periods with insufficient availability and quality of technical service. According to 
major customers (Ahuja, 2006) (Dunn, 2006) this problem is encountered with all 
major suppliers and it thereby offers a distinct possibility for competitive advantage 
for the first supplier that manages to master this field. The issues in TSD are partly 
due to a weak Human Resource Department, which does not understand the 
company strategy, customers, products, employees etc. 
 
HEMPEL’s greatest asset is the people and the TSD is a significant part of the total 
offering. It is therefore imperative that these weak areas will not be allowed to 
continue is the opposite direction of the global strategy. 
 
Opportunities 
India is offering great opportunities for a company like HEMPEL. The huge 
population is creating a growing demand with increasing requirements to quality. The 
economic growth between 6.9 - 8.5% in the last three years is one of the largest in 
the world and has created a middle class of around 300 million. The potential for 
Marine and Protective coatings of around EUR 100 million is only surpassed in the 
Asia Pacific region by Japan and Korea as China is excluded from Hempel’s Asia 
Pacific region (Global Industry Analysis Inc., 2004). HEMPEL is only capturing 
around 1% of this business in India compared to the global market share of 12-13% 
and the demand is estimated to increase faster than the average. 
 
The large, qualified and low cost workforce for both blue and white collar labour, 
combined with the abundance of land providing reasonable cost for warehousing and 
manufacturing, present companies with a value for money unchallenged by most 
countries in the world. 
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Much criticism can be directed at the government style in India, but it does create 
opportunities for businesses when a relatively stable political environment is 
consistently improving the political system through reforms, albeit at a rather slow 
pace. 
 
India’s roads, railways and ports are still too inefficient to provide the coatings 
industry with a true competitive advantage compared to other countries. Huge 
investments in this infrastructure are ongoing and planned for the future, so 
combined with favourable factor endowments, industry rivalry and demand 
conditions HEMPEL (India) has the opportunity to become the production base for 
HEMPEL countries in the region and even globally. 
 
Only one major competitor has set up a subsidiary with production in India so far. 
HEMPEL therefore has the opportunity build up an organisation and build stronger 
relationships before other competitors enter India on a larger scale. 
 
Threats 
The high levels of bureaucracy and corruption are definitely threats to smooth 
operations, but it is very much part of accepting a different work culture if one wishes 
to get a share of this interesting market. There is a need for patience and local 
expertise to minimise the hassle of a heavy bureaucracy. In addition, companies can 
curb corruption by accepting that some business is not worth pursuing. These 
threats can therefore be managed to a great extent by careful consideration when 
preparing sales and expense projections. 
The heavy legal system is part of the above bureaucracy, but it is still relatively well 
functioning and transparent compared to other developing countries such as 
Vietnam. The general high staff turnover in India, which is a great threat to 
companies such as HEMPEL offering complex solutions, and strict labour laws call 
for a much more efficient HR than what HEMPEL has in the region today. 
 
The high level government intervention meets world-wide criticism and should also 
be factored in to the budgets of HEMPEL, but even this limited economic freedom is 
improving. 
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As for most other markets in the world there is a significant risk that fierce 
competition between competitors hungry for larger shares of the expanding demand 
can drive profits down to unhealthy levels. The global phenomenon of high 
bargaining power of suppliers and buyers could contribute further to the pressure on 
margins. 
 
The above highlights significant strengths and opportunities for HEMPEL in India and 
the weaknesses are not unchangeable by any means. The greatest risk is therefore 
the aggressive pricing policies of the competitors eager to capture early market 
shares and justify their investments in India. 
 
9 Internationalisation process leading to goal formulation 
The analysis of existing literature, the external environment in India and the internal 
environment in HEMPEL has now provided a good base for deciding on a future 
direction. 
 
HEMPEL’s internationalisation process is very similar to Jan Johanson and Finn 
Wiedersheim-Paul’s (1975) Uppsala internationalisation process, also called the 
Stage theory. HEMPEL started expanding to countries geographically close to 
Denmark or with limited psychic distance. It furthermore started with limited 
transactions through exporting, then through an agent and finally establishing own 
subsidiaries and/or production facilities. HEMPEL has had a limited market 
commitment in India for more than 40 years and the market knowledge gained will 
reduce the risks associated with a decision to increase HEMPEL’s commitment as 
per the Uppsala internationalisation model in section 3. 
 
Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul are also involving the external environment in their 
considerations and in this case there is certainly an attractive local demand. The 
SWOT analysis highlights other opportunities such as the factor endowments while 
warning against the threats, which are unlikely to change significantly in the near 
future. These threats are however not detrimental to a company as long as the 
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expectations are adjusted accordingly. The existing literature and the external 
environment are thereby supporting an expansion for HEMPEL in India. 
 
The analysis of the internal environment has shown that HEMPEL has the 
experience, reputation, products, people and global network to perform well in the 
Indian market. Just as importantly an expansion in India would fit very well with the 
new global HEMPEL strategy. As discussed earlier the buyers in India are becoming 
more sophisticated and their demand for internationally recognised quality products 
enables HEMPEL to focus on the higher end of the market and follow the global goal 
for the Marine segment: An EBIT of 14% in 2011. 
 
HEMPEL is not active in the Japanese market, which by far is the largest Protective 
market in Asia Pacific. India is the second largest and can thereby be a significant 
contributor to the global Protective strategy aiming to become a profitable No. 1 by 
market share globally by 2011. HEMPEL Asia Pacific is targeting sales of EUR 46.29 
million by 2011 and HEMPEL (India) could add EUR 6.78 million, which is a quite 
considerable contribution. Since HEMPEL in India is basically starting from zero 
Protective business it is not realistic to hope for a 25% market share by 2011 as for 
the existing Asia Pacific goal setting and similarly the 13.5% for the global goal 
setting may be too ambitious. The goal for the Protective in India will instead follow, 
and slightly exceed, HEMPEL’s global goal for development in the Protective market 
share from 7% in 2005 to 13.5% in 2011 – an annual increase of 1.1 percentage 
point. This means that HEMPEL (India)’s goal is a profitable market share of 7% by 
2011. 
 
10  Strategic direction 
10.1  Entry mode/ expansion mode 
HEMPEL has been active in India for decades, so this is not an entry into a 
completely unexplored market. HEMPEL’s involvement has however been to such a 
limited extent in recent years that it is worthwhile reviewing all the options. Pan and 
Tse’s (2000) Hierarchical Model of Market Entry Modes provides a good overview of 
the available options. 
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Figure 10.1: Pan and Tse’s (2000) Hierarchical Model of Choice of Entry Modes 
 
It is important to note that Pan and Tse do not disagree with Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul’s Uppsala Internationalisation Model, but that they actually build 
on this and other theories to conceptualise the decision-making process related to 
the choice of entry mode or commitment decisions as it is referred to in the 
Internationalisation Model. 
 
Non-Equity Modes 
HEMPEL’s present liaison office arrangement in India would fall under the export 
mode of entry. As mentioned by Cavusgil et al (2002) and Jan Johanson & Finn 
Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) in their Internationalisation Model exporting provides 
advantages such as minimum risk, no investment in capital, very low start-up costs 
and the opportunity to learn more about the market before going to the next stage of 
commitment. An additional benefit by indirect exporting is the instant access to the 
domestic intermediaries’ local knowledge and market network. Direct exporting, on 
the other hand, allows the manufacturer to maintain control of the intensity and 
quality of the marketing. 
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The contractual entry modes offer similar advantages in terms of risk, investment, 
start-up costs and fast access to new foreign markets. Other benefits can include a 
fixed income in form of royalties from licensing or from sales of technology through 
R&D contracts.    
 
Despite these advantages existing literature and the preceding analysis suggest that 
HEMPEL should not engage in the non-equity modes at this point in time. Pan and 
Tse (2000) list determining factors such as risk, marketing management and the 
relationship between the host and home country while Agarwal and Ramaswami 
(1992) focus on Dunning’s Eclectic (OLI) paradigm including an important factor 
such as market potential. 
 
HEMPEL’s presence in India spanning over the last 4 decades significantly reduces 
the unknown and while the risks as highlighted should not be under-estimated they 
are deemed acceptable in relation to the potential reward. The search for economies 
of scale and long-term focus on high potential markets has meant that companies 
are more likely to use equity modes instead of non-equity modes (Agarwal & 
Ramaswami, 1992).  
 
The paint industry for the concerned segments is considered a rather small world 
and it is of paramount importance that the value of the brand is protected through 
uniform and quality marketing. The complexity of the product offering, combined with 
the fact that the next couple of years are considered very important in India, 
suggests that HEMPEL should maintain a level of control impossible through 
contractual agreements. 
 
The ownership advantages (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992)(Dunning, 2001) 
strengthens the argument that HEMPEL should not go for the contractual 
agreements as there is a significant risk of losing technology wherein significant R&D 
resources has been invested. Furthermore HEMPEL has the size and international 
experience that favour a stronger commitment through the equity mode. 
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Equity Modes 
An equity joint venture, or simply joint venture, allows the manufacturer to share the 
risk and capital with a domestic partner while benefiting from their strengths 
(Cavusgil et al, 2002) such as local knowledge, existing brand value, marketing and 
distribution channels. A joint venture may also be the only way for a foreign company 
to enter an emerging market where wholly owned subsidiaries of foreign entities are 
not allowed such as the case of India before the regulatory liberalisation started in 
1991. 
 
Kale and Anand (2006) found a significant reduction in the formation of joint ventures 
and an increase in terminations of the same as regulations gradually were relaxed. 
The below graph shows a clear trend, which is even more dramatic, when one 
considers the tremendous increase in foreign investment into India over the period. 
 
Graph 10.2: Formation and termination of joint ventures in India (Kale & Anand, 2006) 
 
The initial benefits of a joint venture may start the relationship off as a happy 
marriage, but Kale and Anand (2006) highlights how hostile terminations are plentiful 
in India as the parties learn enough from each other to manage independently if the 
regulation allows. HEMPEL has experienced the phenomena of an “ugly divorce” 
such as the recent termination of the joint venture in Bahrain and it is likely to have a 
severe impact on the business in that country for months or even years. 
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Finally Kale and Anand (2006) brings up an issue, which is very relevant to 
HEMPEL. They explain how MNEs with operations all over the world are starting to 
have a more global view of their business and how joint ventures can hamper global 
or regional strategies since the local partners may have their own agenda. 
HEMPEL’s new global strategy ‘One HEMPEL – Everywhere’, with alignment as one 
of the main pillars, is facing these exact challenges. What is good for the Group as a 
whole may not necessarily be desirable for the local partners in e.g. the Middle East. 
 
The ownership advantages mentioned above under the non-equity modes are also 
very valid for joint ventures and perhaps even more so as joint venture partners 
usually obtain a deeper insight into each others’ operations. The protection of 
technology has previously been an issue for HEMPEL. In Korea for example, the 
joint venture partner managed to jump-start their own business with recipes 
suspiciously similar to those owned by HEMPEL. 
 
10.2  Import of goods vs. local manufacturing 
As highlighted by Hill (2006) the choice between importing of goods versus local 
manufacturing is dominated by the impact of transportation costs and trade barriers 
such as tariffs. Coatings are relatively low value-to-weight products and the below 
table from Chapter 6 shows how the transportation from factory to a main warehouse 
in India would constitute almost 5% of the sales price excluding taxes. 
 
The table further shows how the total cost impact of transportation and tariffs causes 
import to be 14.5% more expensive than local manufacturing. The lower labour costs 
in India provide a slight advantage for local manufacturing, but since the coatings 
manufacturing is more capital-intensive than labour-intensive the small savings are 
not included in the figures. 
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Table 10.3: Cost structures for local manufacturing versus import of finished goods 
 
Considering the competitiveness and price-sensitivity in the coatings world combined 
with the fact that HEMPEL over the past years have had an EBIT of 7.1 - 9.4% it is 
paramount that HEMPEL invests in local manufacturing in order to be competitive. 
 
The Net Present Value (NPV) analysis in Appendix 4 contains the investments 
necessary to have local manufacturing able to supply 2,000,000 litres in 2009. Based 
on a horizon of 10 years an investment into India is estimated to provide a positive 
NPV of EUR 3,842,590. 
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11 Conclusion 
Any entry into, or significant expansion in, markets of developing economies are 
always associated to a fair share of risk. HEMPEL has for a long time had India in a 
position of stand-by, but three different sides are now supporting action. 
 
The existing theories and literature from renowned scholars and researchers, 
especially the Stage Theory from Jan Johanson and Finn Wiedersheim-Paul’s 
(1975) Uppsala Internationalisation Model, suggest that HEMPEL’s experience 
reduces the potential risks to a level where it is acceptable given the great potential 
for profits. 
 
The external analysis of the market in India reveals an improving and stable 
environment where the risks should not be ignored, but rather managed and 
accommodated for. India’s economy is one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world achieving around 8.5% growth the last three years. At the same time the costs 
for labour and land are providing excellent value for money. This has created an 
increasing demand for local projects as well as export projects.   
 
The internal analysis shows that HEMPEL has the capabilities and resources to 
succeed in India. Certain aspects of the value creation such as HR and TSD should 
be improved to maximise the competitive advantage, but very importantly HEMPEL 
has the products and brand to make an immediate impact. The timing fits not only 
with the existing literature and the external environment, but it fits very well with 
HEMPEL’s new strategy “One HEMPEL – Everywhere” to be launched January 
2007. HEMPEL (India) will be able to follow the global Marine strategy focusing on 
profitability while it for the regional Protective strategy could be a vital contributor to 
reach the ambitious goal to be a profitable no. 1 by market share in 2011 as India 
provides the second largest potential in this HEMPEL region. 
 
A relatively small set-up returns an estimated NPV of EUR 3,842,590, so the 
decision should not be on whether to go or not, but rather on how big HEMPEL 
wants to go. India is in many ways moving slower than China and it may in HEMPEL 
   Page 77 
 
 
never really catch up, but the right decision here could pave the way for one of the 
largest HEMPEL companies in the future. 
 
The Decorative paints are by far the largest segment in India valued at EUR 650 
million per annum (Equitymaster.com, 2005) with a yearly increase of twice their 
GDP (Equitymaster.com, 2006) and further research into HEMPEL’s possibilities in 
this segment is recommended. 
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13 Appendices 
13.1  Appendix 1 - Definitions 
Container coatings:  Sales for the manufacturing and refurbishment of 
containers for sea freight 
Decorative paints:  Sales of house paints to private consumers through retail 
outlets and direct sales to builders of larger housing 
projects.  
Fouling control: It is essential to keep the underwater area of ships clean 
from fouling such as barnacles. This is primarily done 
through the use of antifouling paint releasing agents from 
the paint surface or the latest fouling release technology 
utilising a smooth silicone surface to prevent settlements. 
These technologies are referred to as fouling control.  
Marine coatings (MC): Sales to the merchant vessels, navy vessels, fishing 
vessels etc. 
Powder coatings: All HEMPEL’s paints and coatings are “liquid” whereas 
powder coatings are “dry”. It is a different technology with 
a different production process and the two technologies 
only seldom fight for the same projects. 
Protective coatings (PC):  Sales to oil & gas installations and pipelines, wind 
turbines, chemical plants, power generation plants, 
bridges, cranes etc. but excluding automotive paints. 
TSD:    Technical Service Department 
Yacht paints:   Sales to private pleasure crafts/boats/yachts 
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13.2  Appendix 2 – Maps of India 
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13.3  Appendix 3 – EIA Report 
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13.4  Appendix 4 – Net Present Value analysis 
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